9948_Have financial analysts understood IFRS 9 A critical appraisal of the impacts of the new impairment rules on analy

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Master’s dissertation

School of Business

Have financial analysts understood IFRS 9?
A critical appraisal of the impacts of the new impairment rules
on analysts’ current forecast accuracy and forecast revision
behaviour for banks in Europe

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
M.Sc. in International Accounting and Finance
at Dublin Business School

Dennis Schoenleben (10176003)

Programme title

Submission date
M.Sc. in International Accounting and Finance
08/2015
II
Declaration

I, Dennis Schoenleben, declare that this research is my original work and that it has never
been presented to any institution or university for the award of Degree or Diploma. In
addition, I have referenced correctly all literature and sources used in this work and this work
is fully compliant with the Dublin Business School’s academic honesty policy.

Signed: Dennis Schoenleben

Date: 28 August 2015

III
Table of Contents
Declaration
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. II
Table of Contents
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. III
List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
VI
List of Figures ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
VI
Acknowledgements
……………………………………………………………………………………………….
VII
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
VIII
List of abbreviations ……………………………………………………………………………………………….
IX
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
…………………………………………………………………………………… 1
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review ………………………………………………………………………….. 6
2.1 Literature Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
2.2 The Role of Analyst’ Forecasts in Capital Markets ………………………………………………. 6
2.3 Influential Factors on Analyst’ Forecasts
……………………………………………………………. 7
2.4 Relevance of Accounting Information to Analyst Forecasts
…………………………………. 10
2.4.1 Accounting Data and Analyst Forecasts
…………………………………………………… 10
2.4.2 Accounting Standard Changes and Analyst Forecasts
……………………………….. 10
2.4.2.1 Individual Accounting Standard Changes and their Implications
on Analyst Forecasts …………………………………………………………………… 10
2.4.2.2 Multiple Accounting Standard Changes and the Implications for
Analyst Forecasts
……………………………………………………………………….. 11
2.5 IFRS 9 versus IAS 39 Impairment Rules
………………………………………………………….. 13
2.5.1 Conceptual Review of the Incurred Loss Model (IAS 39)…………………………….. 14
2.5.2 Conceptual Review of the Expected Loss Model (IFRS 9) ………………………….. 18
2.5.3 Discussion about Implications of the Change in the Impairment Model
on Analyst Forecasts ……………………………………………………………………………. 23
2.5.4 Anticipated Effects from the New Impairment Rules on Banks’ Loss
Allowances …………………………………………………………………………………………. 25
2.6 Literature Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………. 28
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology……………………………………………………………………………. 29
3.1 Methodology Introduction
………………………………………………………………………………. 29
3.2 Research Design …………………………………………………………………………………………. 30
3.2.1 Research Philosophy ……………………………………………………………………………. 30
3.2.2 Research Approach ……………………………………………………………………………… 31
3.2.3 Research Strategy ……………………………………………………………………………….. 32
3.2.4 Sampling – Selecting Entities and Forecasts …………………………………………….. 33
3.3 Research Ethics
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 37
IV
3.5 Limitations of Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………. 38
3.6 Methodology Conclusion
……………………………………………………………………………….. 40
CHAPTER FOUR: Data Analysis/Findings
……………………………………………………………….. 41
4.1 Researcher’s Forecasts ………………………………………………………………………………… 41
4.2 Hypothesis 1 ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
4.3 Hypothesis 2 ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 55
4.3.1 Analysts’ Credit Risk Forecast Accuracy ………………………………………………….. 55
4.3.2 Analysts’ EPS Forecast Accuracy …………………………………………………………… 58
CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion / Discussion / Recommendations …………………………………… 64
5.1 Discussion of Hypothesis 1 ……………………………………………………………………………. 66
5.2 Discussion of Hypothesis 2 ……………………………………………………………………………. 67
5.3 Overall Conclusion
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 67
5.4 Classification of Research Findings in the Literature and Recommendations
…………. 68
CHAPTER SIX: Self-Reflection on Learning and Performance ……………………………………. 70
6.1 Self-Appraisal ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 70
6.2 Problem-Solving…………………………………………………………………………………………… 72
6.3 Summary of Added Value ……………………………………………………………………………… 74
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75
Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 91
Appendix 1: Ranking of the largest significant banks in Europe that prepare
their financial statements in accordance with IFRS………………………………… 91
Appendix 2: Analysts’ EPS forecast revisions for the forecast years 2015 and
2016, over the period July 2014 – July 2015 (1/3) …………………………………. 92
Appendix 3: Analysts’ consensus EPS forecasts for the forecast years
2015 – 2018 on 7th August 2015 (1/2) ………………………………………………… 95
Appendix 4: Analysts’ consensus credit risk forecasts for the forecast years
2015 – 2017 on 7th August 2015………………………………………………………… 97
Appendix 5: Research timetable ………………………………………………………………………….. 98
Appendix 6: Assignations of banks’ businesses to categories within conducted
studies
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 99
Appendix 7: Abstract of information utilised from HSBC’s 2014 financial
statements ……………………………………………………………………………………. 100
Appendix 8: Abstract of information utilised from Barclays’ 2014 financial
statements (1/2) …………………………………………………………………………….. 101
Appendix 9: Abstract of information utilised from Deutsche’s 2014 financial
statements (1/2) …………………………………………………………………………….. 103
V
Appendix 10: Abstract of information utilised from BNP Paribas’ 2014 financial
statements (1/2) …………………………………………………………………………….. 105
Appendix 11: Abstract of information utilised from Credit Agricole’s 2014 financial
statements ……………………………………………………………………………………. 107
Appendix 12: Events occurring in months where significant analysts’ EPS
forecast revisions took place, and their presumed effects on
analysts’ forecasts
………………………………………………………………………….. 108
Appendix 13: Credit risk forecast differences expecting minimal transitional
impacts on loan loss reserves with the introduction of the IFRS 9
impairment rules
…………………………………………………………………………….. 108
Appendix 14: Credit risk forecast differences expecting average transitional
impacts on loan loss reserves with the introduction of the IFRS 9
impairment rules
…………………………………………………………………………….. 109
Appendix 15: Analyst forecasts of credit risk positions for the years 2015 -2017
and the banks’ reported figure as at 31.12.2014
………………………………….. 110
Appendix 16: EPS forecast differences expecting minimal transitional impacts on
loan loss reserves with the introduction of the IFRS 9 impairment
rules …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 111
Appendix 17: EPS forecast differences expecting average transitional impacts
on loan loss reserves with the introduction of the IFRS 9
impairment rules
…………………………………………………………………………….. 112
Appendix 18: Analysts’ EPS forecasts for the years 2015 -2018 and the
banks’ reported figure as at 31.12.2014 …………………………………………….. 113

VI
List of Tables
Table 1: Analysts’ credit risk forecasts for fiscal years 2015 – 2017 ……………………………… 37
Table 2: Analysts’ EPS forecasts for fiscal years 2015 – 2018 …………………………………….. 37
Table 3: The researcher’s credit risk forecast results for the years 2015 till 2017 …………… 49
Table 4: The researcher’s EPS forecast results for the years 2015 till 2018 ………………….. 50
Table 5: Significant analyst EPS forecasts revisions for 2015 and 2016
forecasts ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 52
Table 6: Analysts’ credit risk forecast accuracy over the observation period
2015 – 2017 …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 57
Table 7: Analysts’ EPS forecast accuracy over the observation period
2015 – 2018 …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 60

List of Figures
Figure 1: Review of the IAS 39 impairment rules
………………………………………………………. 15
Figure 2: Review of the IFRS 9 impairment rules ……………………………………………………… 19
Figure 3: Anticipated transitional effects on banks’ balance sheets associated with
the accounting standard change from IAS 39 to IFRS 9
……………………………….. 24
Figure 4: Overview of studies estimating the transitional effects on banks’
loan loss reserves by a switch in impairment rules from
IAS 39 to IFRS 9 ……………………………………………………………………………………. 25
Figure 5: The ‘research onion’
……………………………………………………………………………….. 29
Figure 6: Relative changes in analysts’ 2015 EPS forecasts ………………………………………. 53
Figure 7: Relative changes in analysts’ 2016 EPS forecasts ………………………………………. 53

VII
Acknowledgements
I would like to sincerely acknowledge a number of people who enabled me completing the
whole Master program and thesis in its present form.

First I am grateful to my supervisor Mr Andrew Quinn for all his advice and encouragement
in pursuing the research topic throughout the whole program.

I would also express my gratitude to my loved girlfriend for all her patience and strengths
she gave me during the year.

Finally there are my family and friends I would like to deeply thank for their encouragement
and support in any kind of form. It would not have been possible without all of you because
in the end the individual is only as strong as the team behind him and I am glad that I have
all of you on my side.

VIII
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine whether the prospective mandatory
change in the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for financial instruments
from IAS 39 to IFRS 9, with regard to impairment rules, is known by analysts currently
making estimates about banks in Europe, and whether it is fully reflected in their current
forecasts. Literature review – A wide range of literature was analysed to attain knowledge
about pre-existing theories with reference to accounting changes and their impacts on (1)
analysts’ forecast revision behaviour, and (2) forecast accuracy during pre-adoption periods.
Moreover, by reviewing impairment methods, IAS 39’s incurred loss model and the expected
loss model prescribed by IFRS 9, a basis for understanding the implications of this
impairment-method change on banks’ financial statements is provided. Finally, the literature
chapter discusses studies previously conducted which quantify the expected transitional
impacts caused by the impairment method change on banks’ loss allowance. Design /
methodology / approach – To address the complexity involved and to fulfil the research
goals, a case study approach was adopted as the research method, aimed to holistically test
whether certain theories apply to changes in the particularly-complex accounting standard
IAS 39 for real-life situations for the five largest banks in Europe. Aside from previous
studies, this thesis assesses forecast accuracy between the researchers’ own estimates and
published analyst forecasts. Findings – The empirical results indicate that the impairment
change currently plays a more subordinated role in analyst forecasts for these five banks
than other factors. In addition, results hint that analyst forecasts for these five banks are
likely to be significantly revised in the near future. Research limitations – Caused by the
forward-looking nature of this research, findings within this study are biased by subjective
judgements made by the researcher, as well as by the availability of public data at the time
this research was conducted. Furthermore, due to the characteristics of a case study
approach, the samples selected within the research are not to represent the population as a
whole, thus insights are limited to these particular cases. Originality/value – This research
suggests that because of the subordinate role played by the new impairment rules in analyst
forecasts, falling stock prices will more than likely materialise for banks in the near future due
to IFRS 9. By selecting own estimates to determine forecast accuracy, the researcher aims
to enhance the practical value of this research and to encourage scholars to apply more
real-life approaches when conducting research.

IX
List of abbreviations
Abbreviation
Description

Abbreviation
Description
AG
German Public Limited
Company

n/a
not applicable or not available

ECB
European Central Bank

P/E
Price Earnings

ED
Exposure Draft

PLC
Public Limited Company

EFRAG
European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group

ROCE
Return on Capital Employed

EPS
Earnings per Share

RoE
Return on Equity

EU
European Union

SA
Société Anonyme

DPS
Dividends per Share

SFAS
Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard

Forex (FX)
Foreign exchange

UK
United Kingdom

G20
A group of twenty countries with
the world’s biggest economies

US
United States

GAAP
General Accepted Accounting
Principles

WACC
Weighted Average Cost of
Capital

IAS
International Accounting
Standard

IASB
International Accounting
Standard Board

IBOR
Interbank offered rate

IFRS
International Financial
Reporting Standards

IMF
International Monetary Fund

1
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

The financial crisis in 2008 has ruthless unveiled the flaws of the accounting standard
addressing financial instruments (IAS 39), and changed the understanding of regulators as
well as users of financial statements about sufficient risk-provisions. This change in
understanding has created a need for a new contemporary standard for financial instruments
(IASB, 2014b). As a consequence, the ‘IAS 39 replacement project’ was set up by the IASB
aiming to replace IAS 39 with a standard that is “less complex, more relevant and [provide
more decision-making] useful” (Huian, 2013, p.1) information to users of financial
statements. This project ended in July 2014 with the publication of the new IFRS 9 standard,
incorporating as its centrepiece a more forward-looking impairment method which will
become effective in 2018, but can be applied earlier (IASB, 2014b). This new standard is not
yet endorsed by the EU, meaning that it is not applicable for European companies; however,
it is likely to be endorsed in 2015. According to the IASB, this new standard should enhance
financial statement users’ trust through creating a greater reliability in the financial
statements of financial institutions, in particular for banks, by providing more useful
information (2014a). Analysts’ forecasts are one of those decision-making processes which
should benefit from the new impairment model.

Although some studies (e.g. Onali and Ginesti (2014), Cuzman et al. (2010)) have already
investigated the market reaction from users of financial statements in Europe caused by the
change to IFRS 9, and found it to be positive, to the authors knowledge there has not been
any study carried out investigating the influences of the new standard on analyst forecast
accuracy prior to adoption. Cuzman et al. (2010) revealed declining market volatility in
Europe caused by the change in the classification and measurement of financial instruments
in IFRS 9. In part because this study only provides evidence for the first phase of the ‘IAS 39
replacement’ project, and neglects subsequent modifications in this standard as well as the
impairment process until its final version, further research is needed. A pioneer study,
quantifying the effects of the change in impairment rules on banks’ loan loss reserves on the
transition date effective with IFRS 9, was conducted by the IASB in 2013 (2013a). This study
revealed that banks’ loss allowances will increase by 30 % – 250 % for mortgage portfolios
and 25 % – 60 % for non-mortgage portfolios when normal market conditions prevail in this
future time period. Following this study, Deloitte (2014a) conducted its own research
investigating the expectations among systemically-important banks worldwide on this issue.
They documented similar results for non-mortgage portfolios but varying results for mortgage
portfolios. The Deloitte study concludes that banks’ loss allowances will rise by up to 50 %
across all loan asset classes, and that the capital required is going to increase. In the end,
2
these studies show that, on the transition date, the accounting change will have significant
impacts on banks’ credit risks, loan loss reserves, and EPS and RoE ratios; all crucial
forecast items for analysts. As some of the first researchers to examine the pre-adoption
markets reactions about this new standard for financial and non-financial companies, Onali
and Ginesti (2014) suggested that investors appreciate the new standard in terms of better
comparability between companies and the shareholder-wealth creation that it offers.
Although that study provides valuable early results about market reaction after IFRS 9 was
issued, their findings do not provide insights into analysts’ pre-adoption forecast
performances or awareness.

(i)
Research Objectives / Questions / Hypotheses
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether the change in the IFRS concerning
impairment rules (IFRS 9) of financial instruments, is well known and fully included by
analysts when making estimates for banks. Moreover, it aims to quantify possible future
effects on key financial ratios and figures of this IFRS. Finally, it provides suggestions about
prospective trends in forecasts for banks when preparing their financial statements in
accordance with IFRS in Europe.

Given these parameters, the researcher aims to address the following research question:

What current role do the new impairment rules for financial instruments prescribed by
IFRS 9 play in analyst forecasts covering banks in Europe?

The question is addressed with the following hypotheses:

H1
The announcement of IFRS 9 by the IASB on 24th July 2014 has caused a significant
revision in analysts’ earnings forecasts for banks preparing their financial statements
in accordance with IFRS in Europe for the fiscal years 2015 and 2016, over the
period July 2014 to July 2015, because of the change in impairment method.

H2
The accuracy of analysts’ EPS and credit risk forecasts estimated for banks
preparing their financial statements in accordance with IFRS in Europe will
deteriorate due to a failure to adequately factor in the effects of the new impairment
rules prescribed by IFRS 9 in their annual forecasts from 2015 until 2018.
3
(i).1
Rationale First Hypothesis
The first hypothesis addresses the research question by examining the reaction from
analysts after the public announcement of the IFRS 9 standard by the IASB. If analysts are
aware of the change, it can be expected that they significantly revise their forecasts for 2015
and 2016 between the time period July 2014 and July 2015. Although researchers (Cheung
(1990), Bernard & Thomas (1990), Trueman (1990)) have documented the fact that analysts
are reluctant to revise their forecasts due to new information, others also acknowledge that
analysts revise their forecasts when the new information is perceived to be relevant to their
short-term earnings forecasts. If this is not the case, they omit this information in their long-
term forecasts. This notion is consistent with the findings of Mest & Plummer (1999) and
Abarbanell & Bushee (1997). Since IFRS 9 is likely to be endorsed by the EU Commission in
2015 (EFRAG, 2015), banks are permitted to already apply this standard for their 2015 fiscal
year, thus fulfilling the requirements of having a short-term effect on analyst earnings
forecasts. While a small number of participants in the IASB research (2013b) implied that it
would take three years to fully implement all the changes outlined in IFRS 9, most
companies did not provide any information about the expected timeframe required. This has
left questions of whether implementation is feasible in 2015 open to interpretation.

(i).2
Rationale Second Hypothesis
Moreover, even if analysts have revised their forecasts over the time period after the
announcement was made, the question remains as to whether they have accurately included
the possible transitional effects for the forecast periods from 2015 until 2018. This issue is
addressed in the second hypothesis of this research.

When making estimates or projecting trends about the future, analysts rely on time-series
historical data. With IFRS 9, these time-series trends, as well as the composition of some
forecasted items, are going to be disrupted due to the material change of current IAS 39
requirements regarding the classification and impairment computations for financial
instruments. This is expected to impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy. Prior literature (Peek
(2005), Ayres & Rodgers (1994), Elliott & Philbrick (1990), Biddle & Ricks (1988), Hughes &
Ricks (1986)) shares the perception that accounting changes typically increase analysts’
uncertainty and therefore negatively interfere with their ability to make precise forecasts.
Whereas all these studies examined individual accounting changes, the change from IAS 39
to IFRS 9 might require investigating more comprehensive accounting changes such as the
adoption of the whole set of IFRS standards in Europe in 2005. The rationale for that is that
the IAS 39 to IFRS 9 change probably produces wide-ranging influences on large sections of
4
bank balance sheets. The consequences of adopting the whole IFRS standards as been
thoroughly investigated through different studies (Tan et al. (2011), Chee Seng & Mahmud
Al (2010), Ernstberger et al. (2008), Kee-Hong et al. (2008), Ashbaugh & Pincus (2001)).
These concluded that the comprehensive accounting changes had positive impacts on
analysts’ forecast precision. However, little is known about the effects of accounting changes
on analysts’ forecast accuracy prior to adoption of these changes. Ball (2006) suggests that
the lack of historically-comparable information, as well as first-time knowledge acquisition
about the new accounting framework, diminishes analysts’ forecasting performance. All of
these cited researchers support the hypothesis that the IFRS 9 accounting change might not
be currently accurately priced in analyst forecasts.

The focus on Europe is interesting because, with the expected adoption of IFRS 9 by the EU
Commission in 2015, the standard will become mandatory for financial institutions in Europe.
After China and the US, European banks represent the largest banks in the world and hence
attract financial analysts globally. Credit risk1 has been chosen within this study because it
includes a significant position of loss allowances and can therefore be seen as the best
proxy for loan loss reserves. In addition, because of the limited data available about credit
risks, the EPS financial ratio has been taken as a second-best proxy for loan loss reserves.

(ii)
Research Value
This work is motivated by a shortage of academic literature about IFRS 9 and its influences
on the market generally, and specifically on analyst forecasts. This thesis aims to extend that
branch of research concerned with analysts’ pre-adoption reactions in terms of forecast
accuracy to accounting changes (Peek (2005), Ayres & Rodgers (1994), Elliott & Philbrick
(1990)), and in analysts’ forecast revision behaviour towards new information (Ho et al.
(2007), Abarbanell & Bushee (1997), Trueman (1990)). In particular, this study includes the
current role that prospective impairment method changes play in analyst forecasts made
about banks in Europe, and quantifies the effects of the IFRS 9 accounting change on key
financial forecast figures and ratios. Moreover, it contributes to research about analysts’
revision behaviours by including an examination of analyst behaviour patterns regarding new
information derived from the accounting change, in terms of forecast revisions.

1 There is no legal definition of credit risk. It is also often named “credit impairment charges and other
credit risk provisions”. Some analysts falsely denote it as “loan loss provisions” which, however, only
incorporate one component of credit risk. Typically included within this position are provision charges
or releases for loan commitments and financial guarantees, impairment charges from Available-for-
Sale debt instruments, reversals of provisions and impairment losses and loan loss provisions, but
can also include other items as well.
5
Although this research provides interesting academic insights, it possesses additional
precious practical value. Insights and results from this research will provide financial
research analysts and people in management positions in funds and institutional
shareholders owning bank shares with necessary information for their own estimates. It will
also provide assessments to help these people gain a better understanding of prospective
market changes. Moreover, this study furnishes current and potential investors with insights
regarding the quality of analyst forecasts.

(iii)
Structure
In investigating its research question and objectives, this thesis is divided into five main
chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 2) aims to explain existing theories and knowledge in
order to justify the research question and hypotheses. Following this, Chapter 3 is dedicated
to providing a rationale for the selected research methodology, before Chapter 4 outlines the
research findings discovered while testing each hypothesis. This chapter also includes key
assumptions made based on the researcher’s own estimates and an analysis of the data
collected. This thesis concludes with a discussion and interpretation of the research findings,
before providing recommendations for possible future research (Chapter 5).
6
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review

2.1 Literature Introduction
The following chapter is setting the basis for the knowledge needed to follow the logic behind
the research objectives of this study. This chapter should assist the reader in gaining a
holistic overview of relevant literature in the research field, outlining the value and reason
behind the research question and enhancing clarity about the subject under study. The
subsequent chapter is thus divided into five main sub-sections. Initially, this thesis outlines
the importance of analyst forecasts in financial markets (2.2) before sub-section 2.3
analyses the drivers of these forecasts, providing insight into relevant pre-existing theories.
Thirdly, sub-section 2.4 discusses the relationship between analyst forecasts and accounting
disclosures in general and accounting changes in particular, laying the foundations on which
this research is built. To justify the research question and understand the reasons why
impairment changes matter to analysts, the differences between the current impairment
model in IAS 39 and the prospective method prescribed by IFRS 9 (2.5) are reviewed before
sub-section 2.6 concludes this chapter.

2.2 The Role of Analyst’ Forecasts in Capital Markets
The expectations that arise after disclosures of corporate information from companies’
owners (shareholders) derive from the information asymmetry between them and a firm’s
managers. Studies from Ross (1973), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe this
phenomenon of “separation between control and ownership” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976,
p.6) as ‘agency theory’, which supposes that management (agents) act differently from
shareholders (principals), due to their varied interests. Usually, shareholders try to restrict
harm from actions by management, and to align principals’ interests by establishing
contracts between themselves and management, subsequently monitoring behaviour by
means of accounting disclosures among other things (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
However, this compliance evaluation is not always possible for investors to carry out, leading
to so-called agency costs. Agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling as the amount
of diminished value shareholders experience because of deviances in managements’ actual
behaviour from its presupposed activities, plus the monitoring costs of the agent (1976). For
this reason, principals depend on so-called information intermediaries like analysts who are
sophisticated users of financial statements. Acquiring and disseminating private information
can reveal undesirable management behaviour through their forecasts in terms of resource
miss-spending and misuse (Healy and Palepu, 2001).

7
Analysts are often perceived as external monitors besides e.g. regulators that insure the
integrity and trustworthiness of companies’ financial statements due to their expertise and
relations with management (Healy and Palepu, 2001). It is seen as part of their role to unveil
accounting biases such as accounting changes when investigating companies’ financial
statements (Peek, 2005). The relationship between financial accounting and analyst
forecasts has been widely studied in recent years in the literature (see sub-section 2.4). As
such, analysts’ forecast accuracy and analysts’ forecast revisions are, alongside analyst
forecast dispersion, the most commonly-used proxies among researchers for analyst
forecast behaviour when measuring the influence of information asymmetry in the market. It
is suggested by various researchers (Jung et al. (2012); Dhiensiri & Sayrak (2010); Bowen
et al. (2008)) that the more analysts there are following a company, the better the
informational environment, which in turn positively affects analysts’ forecast accuracy and
reduces analysts’ interpretations of certain matters, i.e. analysts’ forecast dispersions, thus
lessening the information asymmetry between managers and company outsiders. Existing
literature (Zhu Liu (2014), Sun (2009), Yu (2008)) has determined that the origins for a better
informational environment is improved transparency together with an increase in the
production of corporate information. These factors make it more difficult for managers to
perpetrate fraud, engage in misuse of the company’s resources, or even conduct earnings
management. Investors appreciate these things because they add value by driving up
anticipated future cash flows and reducing uncertainty, which in turn increases the market
value of the company (Mei & Subramanyam, 2008). Prior literature has already documented
that analysts’ estimates and recommendations have a material influence on investors’
investment decisions. A failure by company managers to meet analyst forecasts is often
accompanied by a decline in a firm’s stock price. Ultimately, these insights highlight financial
analysts’ forecasts information asymmetry reducing role in capital markets.

2.3 Influential Factors on Analyst’ Forecasts
Despite the postive relationship between analyst forecasts and agency costs noted in sub-
section 2.2, they are not free from criticism. In order to understand how accurate analyst
forecasts really are, it is essential to understand the factors influencing them. Analyst
forecasts have been widely investigated by researchers in recent years, and their research
documents that analysts’ forecasts are materially influenced by analyst-specific and firm-
specific characteristics (Ernstberger et al., 2008).

Regarding individual characteristics of analysts, the literature provides evidence that analyst
forecasts are biased; however, there is disagreement about whether they are positively or
8
negatively biased. One group (Anandarajan et al. (2008), Lim (2001), Easterwood & Nutt
(1999)) argue that analysts are inclined to be more optimistic in their forecasts in order to
stay on good terms with management. This is because such optimistic forecasts have
positive influences on a firm’s market value and therefore on management remuneration. In
exchange, analysts may also gain access to private information which in turn should have
favourable impacts on their forecast accuracy and therefore their own livelihood. Another
group (e.g. Libby et al. (2008), Burgstahler & Eames (2006)) assert that analyst forecasts
tend to forecast downwards because of incentives from managers through access to private
information. Having more negative forecasts allows managers to meet or even beat these
forecasts more easily, thus permitting positive earnings surprises which usually result in
climbing stock prices.

Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that analyst forecasts are also biased because of
management’s downward expectations management towards a level where they can meet
or even beat those expectations (Washburn & Bromiley (2014), Zhu Liu (2014), Baik and
Jiang (2006)). Managers do that either by influencing the composition of analysts’ earnings,
or by conveying rather pessimistic forecasts. A study by Christensen et al. (2011) claims that
managers provide earnings guidance in order to influence analysts toward certain items
which they should or should not exclude from their earnings forecasts, aside from special
items. Other studies (e.g. Washburn & Bromiley (2014); Das et al. (2011); Baik and Jiang
(2006)) document that management try to influence analyst forecasts through rather
pessimistic earnings forecast guidance. Ultimately, these findings show that expectation-
management by managers and analysts’ dependence on access to private information has
significant influences on analyst forecasts and on the number of forecast revisions.

Another analyst characteristic found by Trueman (1990) is that analysts are rather reluctant
to revise their forecasts when they receive new information, because it could be interpreted
by investors as a sign of weakness on the accuracy of previous data, and hence, of bad
work. Besides the fact that analysts only incorporate new information gradually, prior
literature (e.g. Bernard & Thomas (1990)) has proven that analysts do not even assimilate all
available and value-relevant information in their forecasts. Abarbanell & Bushee’s (1997)
suggested explanation for this inefficient processing of information is that such news has
little or no relevance to short-term earnings forecasts and therefore is omitted in current
long-term forecasts. Based on an example of tax-law changes, Plumlee (2003) also found
that analysts prefer to incorporate less-complex information and its effects into their
forecasts, rather than include complex information. The reasons for this phenomenon are
unknown. Possible explanations are that with an increase in complexity comes increased
9
costs to utilise this information, thus exceeding the benefits provided, or that the complexity
involved exceeds an analyst’s skills to use the information (Plumlee, 2003). One certainty,
however, is that the omission of information reduces an analyst’s forecast accuracy.

In addition, scholarship has proven that analysts’ long-term forecasts are more optimistic
than short-term estimates. Barron et al. (2013) suggests that this phenomenon originates
from the desire to prompt trading and/or win management’s favour. Other aspects evident in
analyst behaviour is that they tend to “herd behaviour”, i.e. conforming to consensus
forecasts (Anandarajan et al., 2008), and are sometimes even governed by stock prices
when making their earnings forecasts. Miller & Sedor (2014) noted that when uncertainty
about the future is high, analysts lose confidence in their own forecasts and sometimes
simply follow the stock price. Furthermore, career concerns may also influence forecast
accuracy. Hong & Kubik (2003) outlines that some forecasts are driven upwards because
brokerage houses and investment banks prefer analysts that promote trading rather than
those that bother too much about forecast accuracy. Nonetheless, most prior research
expounds that forecast accuracy matters to analysts for various reasons. Analysts are
obliged to deliver accurate forecasts because their own career depends on it. A study by
Hong et al. (2000) notes that analysts, who are mainly employed by brokerage firms, usually
have institutional investors as clients; these clients prefer accurate forecasts. They also
assess the quality of analysts’ work in annual polls which in turn has significant impacts on
analyst remuneration, reputation, and future career outcomes (Mikhail et al., 1999).

Aside from these aforementioned characteristics, firm-specific factors such as a company’s
size, managerial ownership, corporate governance policy and country of operations
influence the forecast accuracy of analysts, as has been documented by various studies
(e.g. Ionaşcu (2011), Bok et al. (2010), Bhat et al. (2006)). The bigger the size and the better
the informational environment of a company, the higher the likelihood that there are more
voluntary and high-quality disclosures, reducing agency costs and enhancing analysts’
forecast accuracy.

The lesson learned from this sub-section is that analyst forecasts are influenced by multiple
factors which call into question the accuracy of such forecasts. Nonetheless, the literature
proves that forecast accuracy matters to analysts. The next section is solely dedicated to the
topic of influences of accounting data on analyst forecasts, which has been neglected so far.

10
2.4 Relevance of Accounting Information to Analyst Forecasts
This study will now turn to look at the relevance of accounting data to analyst forecasts,
which then sets the basis of justification for the research question. In doing so, sub-section
2.4.1 discusses the role accounting information plays for analysts when forecasting. Based
on gained insights from that section, the influences of accounting standard changes on
analyst forecasts are discussed and shortly concluded under sub-section 2.4.2.

2.4.1 Accounting Data and Analyst Forecasts
The literature suggests that the information within financial statements significantly
influences analysts’ forecasts. Researchers (e.g. Taylor & Koo (2015), Kee-Hong et al.
(2008), Hsiang-tsai (2005), Bushman et al. (2004), Hope (2003), Lang & Lundholm (1996))
have shown that accounting disclosures reduce analysts’ forecast dispersions and increase
forecast accuracy. The rationale for this is given by a Lang & Lundholm (1996) study which
found that the more information a company unveils to analysts, the less assumptions
analysts thus have to make regarding the firm’s data. Ultimately, this reduction in the
information asymmetry between management and outsiders brings down the number of
interpretations made by different analysts and therefore affects analyst forecast dispersions.
Hsiang-tsai (2005) adds that an increase in forecast accuracy is also associated with fewer
forecast biases and hence reduces the number of uncertain factors.

2.4.2 Accounting Standard Changes and Analyst Forecasts
Based on the fact that accounting information matters to analysts and that it reduces
information asymmetry (sub-section 2.4.1), accounting researchers have been concerned
with the impacts of new accounting information derived from individual accounting standard
changes (sub-section 2.4.2.1) or from changes to a whole set of accounting standards, e.g.
with the IFRS adoption (sub-section 2.4.2.2), on analyst forecasts.

2.4.2.1 Individual Accounting Standard Changes and their Implications on
Analyst Forecasts
The impacts of individual accounting standard changes on analyst forecasts have been
widely investigated by scholars from different angles including forecast errors, forecast
accuracy and forecast dispersion.

Peek (2005) investigated analyst forecast accuracy for companies in the Netherlands from
1988 until 1999, specifically relating to material discretionary accounting changes, and found
11
a significant negative impact on forecast accuracy before the accounting change, depending
on transitional impacts, previous disclosures and the type of accounting change. As an
explanation, the study suggested that changes in earnings trends as well as the composition
of earnings because of these accounting changes disrupts analysts’ forecast models and
hence their abilities to estimate. In the year of change, scholars even noted a significant
deterioration in analyst forecast accuracy when there had been no previous disclosure of the
accounting change before the earnings announcement date (Elliott & Philbrick, 1990). Peek
(2005), however, points out that analysts are not opposed to accounting changes as long as
the type of change allows them to maintain their forecast accuracy and facilitate inter-
company comparisons which are used to predict future trends. Another study by Ayres &
Rodgers (1994) also echoes the aforementioned negative impacts on forecast accuracy in
the form of more forecast errors, but focuses on the mandatory accounting change for
foreign currency translations from SFAS 8 to SFAS 52. This study showed that analysts’
ability to forecast the adoption date of a new standard by a company within the transitional
period, as well as the analyst’s skills in estimating prospective earning impacts, have major
influences on their forecast accuracy. Biddle & Ricks (1988), as well as Hughes & Ricks
(1986), support this view that accounting standard changes increase analyst forecast errors
due to high levels of uncertainty about earnings impacts, even if the change would lead to
higher earnings and even when analysts are already aware of the change. As one of the
more recent studies on this topic, Tzu-Ling et al. (2015) investigated voluntary accounting
standard changes and analyst forecast behaviour over the period 1994 to 2008, and noticed
that analysts’ forecast performance decreased after the post-adoption period due to
analysts’ better understanding of earnings management associated with the change.

Only a small number of studies have proposed different impacts regarding analyst forecasts
and accounting changes. Chen et al. (1990) noticed a decrease in analysts’ forecast
dispersion by observing the same accounting change as in the Ayres & Rodgers (1994)
study. They suggested that this was because of a reduction in uncertainty among analysts
about companies’ risks. Some studies even found no significant effects on forecast accuracy
because of an accounting change. According to Anagnostopoulou (2010), the accounting
choice to capitalise versus expense research and development investments has not shown
any material effect on analysts’ forecast accuracy.

2.4.2.2 Multiple Accounting Standard Changes and the Implications for Analyst
Forecasts
In contrast to prior studies, this research adopts an approach to evaluate analyst forecasts of
banks regarding an individual accounting standard change which affects a large segment of
12
their balance sheet. As such, this change can be compared with the complete change in
accounting standards in 2005 with the adoption of the IFRS in Europe, rather than with an
ordinary individual accounting standard change.

So far, the literature concerned with the implementation of IFRS has documented an
increase in forecast accuracy after voluntary (Kee-Hong et al. (2008), Ashbaugh & Pincus
(2001)) and mandatory adoption (Tan et al. (2011), Chee Seng & Mahmud Al (2010)) of the
IFRS accounting standards. Ernstberger et al. (2008) investigated voluntary IFRS adoptions
from German GAAP to IFRS, tracing these results back to learning curve effects on analysts.
Another reason contributing to this increase in accuracy is increased comparability between
firms which in turn enhances transparency in the market and hence forecast accuracy. This
idea is shared among others including Horton et al. (2013), who examined IFRS adoptions
by firms implementing these standards both voluntarily and through a mandatory
requirement. However, this study also warns that better opportunities for management to
engage in earnings management cannot be completely excluded when observing these
results and that this may also have had an influence on increased forecast accuracy.

Contrary to the post-adoption period of accounting changes, little is known about pre-
adoption effects of changes across a whole set of accounting standards on analyst forecast
accuracy. Ball (2006) suggests that the lack of historically-comparable information, as well
as first-time knowledge acquisition about the new accounting framework, diminishes
analysts’ forecast performance.

In conclusion, scholars have documented that accounting information is relevant to analysts
when making their forecasts, and therefore influences their forecasts as soon as the new
accounting information affects their short-term estimates and is pertinent to future forecast
periods. This justifies the first hypothesis of this research. Nonetheless, researchers convey
rather negative opinions about analyst forecasts prior to an individual accounting change in
terms of forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion. This casts doubt on the accuracy of
current analysts’ estimates for banks with reference to the proper incorporation of
prospective effects from the upcoming IFRS 9 impairment change. This is therefore
addressed with the second hypothesis. To enhance understanding about the implications of
this impairment change on banks’ financial statements due to the move from IAS 39 to IFRS
9, the next section will critically review both impairment models in the respective standards,
and quantify the presumed effects of these.

13
2.5 IFRS 9 versus IAS 39 Impairment Rules
When financial institutions lend money to an individual or a company, they are exposed to
the risk that these parties will not or will only partially pay their contractual-owed cash flows.
This risk is generally known as credit risk. As a bank’s ordinary business is to lend and
borrow money, credit-loss expenses represent a material position within the financial
statements of financial institutions. Other than a bank’s economic capital, which is used to
offset unexpected losses, loss allowances2, i.e. the counter-entry of loan-loss provisions3,
represent both a cushion against expected loan-losses and a source of information to
stakeholders for assessing a bank’s credit risk (Frait-Czech & Komárková, 2013). Due to
complaints from both preparers and users of financial statements about the complexity of
IAS 39, the IASB commenced the so-called ‘IAS 39 replacement’ project even before the
recent financial crisis hit.

IAS 39 replacement project
As can be derived from the name, this project, originated by the IASB, aims to replace the
current standard for financial instruments (IAS 39). Moreover, its goals are to create a
standard which provides more forward-looking and useful information to users of financial
statements and reduces complexity. The project was divided into three phases: Phase 1:
“Classification and measurement”, Phase 2: “Impairment” and Phase 3: “Hedge accounting”.
This work focuses on the results from Phase 2 of the project.

In 2009, due to pressure from the G20 calling for a new accounting standard to enable
quicker recognition of loan-loss provisions during the financial crisis, the IASB further
accelerated the replacement project. This resulted in the completion of the project’s second
phase in July 2014, with the development of the so-called expected loss model within
accounting standard IFRS 9.

The following chapter sets the basis for understanding the implications of the change in
impairment method for banks’ financial statements. If financial statements are significantly
affected by this change, analyst forecasts are also anticipated to be affected, thus justifying
the research question for this research. This section first reviews the requirements of the
current incurred loss model, which is mandatory under IAS 39 (2.5.1), as well as the IFRS 9
expected loss model (2.5.2), before critically discussing the implications of the change in the
impairment model on analysts’ forecasts (2.5.3). Ultimately, sub-section 2.5.4 quantifies

2 Loss allowance is hereinafter used interchangeable with loan loss reserve.
3 Loan-loss provision denotes the expense charge recognised in the statement of profit or loss.
14
possible effects caused by the change in impairment rules on a bank’s loan loss reserve by
reviewing contemporary studies.

2.5.1 Conceptual Review of the Incurred Loss Model (IAS 39)
After the completion of approximately a decade of discussions and a development phase,
IAS 39 “Financial Instruments” became effective on January 2001 (Wagenhofer, 2013).

Under IAS 39, preparers of financial statements are obliged to appraise, at the end of each
period, whether there is one or more verifiable objective evidence(s) caused by one or more
so-called trigger events4 that happened after the initial recognition of a debt instrument (e.g.
bonds, notes, mortgages, etc.), and thus affects future predicted cash flows of the asset or
group of assets entailing an impairment of the financial asset (IAS 39.58).

Trigger events
Trigger events are incidences that concretely affect the credit risk of (1) an individual
financial asset, e.g. significant financial difficulties experienced by the borrower or defaults,
late interest or principal payments, or (2) would likely affect the credit risk of a whole group of
financial assets, e.g. worsening of the domestic and local economic situation such as (i) a
fall in property prices leading to more defaults on mortgages or (ii) the vanishing of an active
market (Hronsky, 2010). IAS 39.59 provides a list of possible trigger events that is not
exhaustive.

For equity instruments (e.g. common stock, convertible debenture, etc.), objective evidence
already exists if there are significant or prolonged5 decreases in the fair value of a financial
asset (Jones & Venuti, 2005), or “significant adverse changes […] in the technological,
market, economic or legal environment” (IAS 39.61). In simplified terms, this means that IAS
39 generally requires supportive evidence that a loss has taken place before an entity can
recognise a loan-loss provision (O’Hanlon, 2013). However, regardless of how likely
expected future losses are, IAS 39 prohibits recognising these losses within the financial
statements until the event actually happens (IAS 39.59). An overview of the IAS 39
requirements regarding loss allowance measurements and interest revenue recognition can
be obtained from Figure 1.

4 Subsequently used interchangeably with loss event and credit event.
5 IAS 39.61 does not specify the terms “significant” or “prolonged”. Lüdenbach and Hoffmann (2014)
on the one hand indicate that a “significant” decrease might be a one-off decrease in the fair value of
20 % or more against the cost of a financial asset. On the other hand, clues for a “prolonged”
decrease could be permanent over nine months ensuing fair value is below the cost of a financial
instrument.
15

Figure 1: Review of the IAS 39 impairment rules
Source: Own representation
16
If there is objective evidence for a trigger event, the entity must impair the financial asset or
group of assets, which in most cases6 is done indirectly through a loss allowance account
within the statement of financial position, and through recognition of loan-loss expenses
within the statement of profit or loss. The evaluation basis for a credit event and computation
of the impairment amount depends on the classification category of the financial asset, i.e.
‘Loans and Receivables’ (LaR), ‘Held to Maturity’ (HtM) or ‘Available for Sale’ (AfS).
Financial liabilities in the category ‘Other Liabilities’ (oL) and financial instruments within the
category ‘Fair Value through Profit or Loss’ (FVtPL) are not subject to impairment rules7.

(i)
Impairment of Financial instruments in LaR and HtM
To appraise whether a trigger event has arisen, the standard requires an investigation into
financial instruments in LaR and HtM which are not already credit-impaired; individually,
when they are significant8, or on a group basis if single assets are insignificant (IAS 39.64). If
objective evidence emerges, the magnitude of the impairment for financial assets held within
the categories of LaR and HtM is the asset’s carrying amount minus the recoverable amount
representing the value of all predicted future cash flows discounted by the effective interest
rate (EIR) set at the first-time recognition of the financial asset (IAS 39.63). Expected losses
are not included in the calculation of cash flows (IAS 39.63).

Effective interest rate (EIR)
“The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash payments
or receipts through the expected life of the financial instrument […]” (IAS 39.9).

In cases of objective evidence that the initial reason for the impairment is no longer
applicable, or after positive developments concerning the financial asset or the group of
assets in periods following the impairment, income recognition up to the carrying amount of
the asset as if the impairment had never been occurred is mandatory (IAS 39.65).

The interest income recognition in the case of an impaired asset is, according to IAS
39.AG93, computed from the net carrying amount by applying an interest rate which arises
after the consideration of the impairment. In the case of financial instruments held in LaR

6 For financial assets within the categories of Loan and Receivables and Held to Maturity, it is also
possible to deduct the impairment value directly from amortised costs.
7 With respect to the scope and aim of this work, no further explanation about the classes of financial
instruments is made in this chapter. For further information about these categories, please see IAS 39
Paragraph 8 and 9.
8 Significant is not defined by the standard itself and hence subject to the definition within the
framework.

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