9820_Enforcement under the Global Climate Regime – Reflections on the Design and Experience

Master Thesis completed in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Master of Laws (LLM) in
Environmental Law at Stockholm University, June 2013

Student

Yenebilh Bantayehu Zena
Student number
860625-T570
Title

Enforcement under the Global Climate Regime: Reflections on the

Design and Experience of the Kyoto-Marrakesh Compliance System
Supervisor

Jonas Ebbesson (Professor of Environmental Law)
Length

19644 words of content (footnotes included)

Acknowledgments
My study at Stockholm University was simply impossible without the support of the
Swedish Institute to which I am highly indebted for awarding me the Swedish Institute
Study Scholarship.
This thesis marks the zenith of a successful academic year I spent at the Faculty of Law in
the Environmental Law Master Program. Having attended several seminars during the
study, I remain thankful to the teachers and classmates for the inspiring discussions which
have made me better as a student. I have specially enjoyed the thought provoking meetings
with Professor Jonas Ebbesson who has made constructive comments on the draft works of
this paper in his capacity of supervision.
Finally I would like to extend my appreciation to my family and friends who have been my
source of strength and perseverance despite being miles away.

Table of Contents
1. Background on climate change and its regime……………………………………………………………………..1
2. Purpose and Scope……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..2
3. Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4
4. Essence of Compliance in International Context………………………………………………………………….5

4.1. The Notion of Compliance and its distinction from related subjects……………………………..5

4.2. Compliance with International Law: A Brief on Theories…………………………………………..7
5. Compliance in International Environmental Law………………………………………………………………..9

5.1. Making MEAs Successful: Cooperation for Compliance or Invocation of State

Responsibility?…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….9

5.2. Place of Sanctions in MEA Compliance………………………………………………………………….11

5.3. From developing new MEAs to enforcing the existing ones………………………………………12

5.4. UNEP and MEA Compliance………………………………………………………………………………..13
6. The Kyoto-Marrakesh Compliance System……………………………………………………………………….14

6.1. Overview…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….14

6.2. Negotiating the compliance procedures: From Buenos Aires to Marrakesh to

COP/CMP.1………………………………………………………………………………………………………………15

6.3. Adoption of the Compliance System: Available options and Challenges…………………….16

6.4. The Compliance Committee………………………………………………………………………………….18

6.4.1. General Features……………………………………………………………………………………18

6.4.2. The Facilitative Branch…………………………………………………………………………..21

6.4.3. The Enforcement Branch………………………………………………………………………..24

6.5. Triggering Compliance Procedures………………………………………………………………………..27

6.5.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..27

6.5.2. Self Triggering………………………………………………………………………………………28

6.5.3. Triggering by a party against another party’s compliance……………………………29

6.5.4. Triggering by regime bodies……………………………………………………………………30

6.6. Fairness and due process in the Kyoto Compliance Procedures………………………………….32

6.7. Experiences with the Compliance Committee………………………………………………………….34

6.7.1. Submission by South Africa: Putting the Facilitative Brach to a Test…………..34

6.7.2. Cases before the Enforcement Branch………………………………………………………36

6.7.3. Concluding remarks on experiences of the enforcement branch………………….41
7. Taking Stock: The Kyoto-Marrakesh Compliance System…………………………………………………42

7.1. Are the enforcement branch decisions enforceable?…………………………………………………42

7.2. Reflection on the legal value of consequences…………………………………………………………43
9. Concluding Perspectives……………………………………………………………………………………………………45
Index of Documents……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………48
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..52

Acronyms

CDM
Clean Development Mechanism

CITES
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora

COP

Conference of Parties

COP/CMP
Conference of Parties serving as Meeting of Parties

ERT

Expert Review Team

GHG

Green House Gas

IPCC
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ITL

International Transaction Log

KP-CP
Kyoto Protocol Compliance Procedures

MEA
Multilateral Environmental Agreement

MRV
Measuring, Reporting and Verification

UNEP
United Nations Environmental Program

UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1

Enforcement under the Global Climate Regime:
Reflections on the Design and Experiences of the Kyoto-Marrakesh
Compliance System
1. Background on climate change and its regime
Excess GHG in the atmosphere as a result of fossil fuel powered civilization has wrecked the natural
atmospheric balance causing the most notorious environmental problem of the contemporary world-
climate change. Science has established that human activities involving release of GHGs (particularly
Carbon dioxide) take the blame for many of the maladies of unexpected climate change.1 The
introduction of unwanted GHGs in to the atmosphere, having the effect of increasing the global
temperature, impedes climate predictability threatening the ability of ecosystem to absorb (and adapt
to) changes. It was, hence, evidently necessary to put in place a mechanism to slow down the pace of
climate change and if possible restore the atmospheric balance. State sovereignty which is the
underlying consideration in international law does not easily fit in to the governance of the
atmosphere as the latter deals with volatile gases moving in disregard of state territory. Owing to its
global scale and seemingly inseparable connection with economic independence, climate change
poses unique challenge to development of a regime appealing to all states. Therefore, an international
regime underscoring the indivisibility of global atmosphere and the common interest of states in its
protection seems the only tenable approach to mitigate impacts of climate change. 2
The devastating effects of climate change garnered the attention of the international community which
negotiated and adopted the UNFCCC in 1992.3 In an effort to achieve its overarching objective of
stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentration4, the Kyoto Protocol was developed incorporating more
robust and detailed commitments.5 Marking the pinnacle of international effort to mitigate effects of
climate change, the Kyoto protocol imposes emission commitment for the convention’s Annex I

1 Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K. & Reisinger, A.(eds.). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (IPCC,
Geneva, Switzerland), at 37.
2 For legal status of the atmosphere see Birnie, P., Boyle, A., and Redgwell, C., International law & the
Environment, Third edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 337.
3 http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php
4 UNFCCC, Article 2.
5 Protocol to the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, adopted in COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997 and came in to force in 2005.
2

(developed) countries.6 These countries are accordingly subjected to obligations of limiting their
emissions within their respective assigned amounts AND collectively reducing their emission by at
least 5 per cent below the 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.7 Article 10 of the
protocol which precludes introduction of any new commitment for non Annex I countries has added
fuel to the traditional north-south environmental dichotomy. Despite ongoing critics regarding its
failure to induce meaningful participation of major emitters like the USA8 and China,9 the protocol
not only survived for the first commitment period, but a second commitment period was agreed in
COP 18 in 2012.10
2. Purpose and Scope
As the Kyoto Protocol surges in to the second commitment period, growing attention is placed on
adherence to the terms of the agreement. Bringing us to the subject of compliance, this study aims at
examining the compliance system adopted by the protocol. With a contextual background in to the
concept of compliance in international relations discourse, it looks up the development and features of
compliance procedures in MEAs. With this foundation, the research continues to discussions on the
more thematic and specific subject of examining the climate regime compliance procedure. It reviews
the negotiation process of the compliance procedure, analyzes the organizational structure of the
compliance committee, identifies the functions of its two branches, and examines the remedies
applicable and their implication on propensity of states to comply. It is often submitted that the
compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol is different from its counterparts in other MEAs. Checking
the validity of such claims, the study aims at the following salient questions.

What new contribution has the Kyoto Protocol compliance system brought to development of
compliance in MEAs?

6 Note that the Annex I list is developed based on membership of political groups mainly the OECD. see:
Depledge, J. “Continuing Kyoto: Extending Absolute Emission Caps to Developing Countries,” in Baumert,
K.A., Blanchard, O., Llosa, S., and Perkaus, J.F. Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options to Protect the Climate
(World Resources Institute, 2002l), pp 31-60, at 34.
7 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3 (1), supra note 5.
8 The US, although an Annex I country, is not subjected to binding emission commitment. “The Bryd-Hagel
Resolution (1997)”, unanimously passed by the US Senate and prevented the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
unless it included emission reduction commitments for developing countries.
9 Despite surpassing the US in Carbon dioxide emissions, China remains to be a non-Annex I country
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_tp20.html,
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php
10Decision 1/CMP.8, “Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, the Doha
Amendment, (FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, 28 February 2013), para 4.
3


Incorporating enforcement as its function, does the climate compliance mechanism offer
strong procedural safeguards capable of enhancing credibility of the system?

Are the practical experiences gained by the enforcement branch consistent with the mandate
entrusted to it by the compliance procedures?

Are there any loopholes within the Kyoto-Marrakesh compliance procedures? If yes, are they
of such a magnitude to endanger the integrity and governance of the global climate regime?
Although facilitation receives fair coverage, the discussion focuses on the quasi-judicial enforcement
functions of the committee as this is acclaimed to be the flagship of climate compliance. A reflection
on consideration of due process and fairness in the operations of compliance systems is tested against
its impact on legitimacy of compliance decisions. A discussion on the road travelled so far reviews the
practical experiences gained in both branches since 2006. Evaluations of the only case before the
facilitative branch coupled with selected four cases handled by the enforcement branch illuminate the
loopholes in the compliance system. Against these accounts; the study asks whether the mechanics
employed by the compliance system have lived up to their promise of averting non-compliance. The
study reflects up on the legal character of the compliance decisions. In concluding, it reaffirms that
the compliance procedures of the Kyoto Protocol represents a new chapter in MEA compliance notion
as it effectively introduced enforcement as an important function although suffering from absence of
mechanism to enforce its important decisions. The present study remains short of analyzing trade
measures as a component of enforcing compliance.
The discussions in this study add to the existing knowledge on compliance in international
environmental law. By explaining the mechanics of the dual approach adopted by the climate
compliance mechanism, the study provokes further researches in to the prospect of such approach in
the design of future MEAs. The reflection on the shift from facilitation to enforcement can be a
starting point for compliance theorists to analyze its implications in the broader compliance and
enforcement discourse. Particularly the relevance of the study goes to the climate governance in terms
of conducting an up-to-date analysis of the experiences and the amplifying details that matter. In light
of the new climate policy afoot, the study can be used as a summary from which detail analysis of the
interaction between the compliance system and other mechanisms under the global climate policy can
be launched.

4

3. Methodology
Starting with the broader subject of compliance, the study delves in to specific and focused discussion
on compliance of the climate regime. The first chapter outlines the notion of compliance in the
international law raising critical concerns of dissecting compliance from related subjects and
understanding the reasons behind state obedience to international law. In order to understand the
motive behind adherence to international law, a trans-disciplinary approach relates international law
to the philosophical theories advanced by international relations scholars. A review of the burgeoning
literature in international relations discipline compares the major theories forwarded to explain the
factors of compliance with international law. Having put the notion of compliance in context, a
highlight of two broad approaches each arguing differently for an effective mechanism of promoting
compliance will follow. With a juxtaposition of carrots and sticks, the entire study examines the
extent of their application in MEAs and more particularly in the climate regime compliance system.
Against the backdrop of compliance in MEAs, the study further narrows down to discuss the Kyoto-
Marrakesh compliance system. Explanation of the negotiation process reviews the interaction among
the successive COP/CMP decisions and outlines how the functionality of the compliance system
transcends in to affecting the integrity of other regime setups; namely the flexibility mechanisms and
the MRV responsibilities. For its core part of the discussion, the study relies on primary sources
mainly in the form of decisions adopted under the Kyoto Protocol relating to establishment and
functioning of the compliance system.
While assessing the much hyped enforcement function of the climate compliance, four cases
involving Greece, Canada, Croatia and Slovakia are discussed in fairly detailed manner as each of
them have had profound importance in the functioning of the procedures. The analysis of these cases
avoids thorough evaluation of the question of implementation as doing so invites examining the MRV
rules of the protocol. Instead the intention is to check the competence of the compliance rules and
identify its drawbacks revealed by the experiences. The remaining four cases (involving Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Lithuania and Romania) are not covered in the study as their proceedings and outcomes did
not pose a new challenge to the compliance system. With regard to the facilitative branch, the only
significant experience gained until present time is covered in light of its contribution to the
development of further compliance rules. The discussion on the consequences of non-compliance
follows a law and economics approach as it demonstrates how law can interfere in to the economic
benefits of a non-complying state. Where relevant the research adopts a comparison of specific
components of the climate compliance system with the arrangements in other MEAs.
5

4. Essence of Compliance in International Context
4.1. The Notion of Compliance and its distinction from related subjects
With the advent of a more interdependent world in the wake of the Cold War, international treaties
covering socio-economic, political and environmental issues became significant components of the
global governance. Whatever their objective, all international treaties share certain basic features.
Aside from creating commitments to be fulfilled by their subjects i.e. usually states, international
treaties are the foundations of cooperation among states to achieve a common goal. Realizing a
common goal in international law provokes studying the interaction between the concepts of
compliance, implementation, effectiveness and dispute settlement. Admittedly these concepts share
common assumptions and at times seem to overlap. While this section does not seek to scrutinize
every aspect of the relationship among them, it only delineates the underlying difference of
compliance from the others. The following paragraphs define compliance and illustrate its distinction
and relation to effectiveness, implementation and dispute settlement in international law.
Defined as “the act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate, command, decree, or
agreement “11, enforcement brings up the discussion of compliance to the surface. Despite perpetual
lexical contest, compliance in this study is captured as “conformity of actor’s (state in our case)
behavior to treaty’s explicit rules.”12 It is imperative to note that the notion of compliance in this study
shall be construed as compliance to explicit rules of the relevant regime. This is done intentionally to
limit its scope excluding discussions on compliance to international customary rules.
Effectiveness and Compliance
Although very much related, compliance and effectiveness of a regime are distinct subjects. The
notion of effectiveness seeks to discover the degree to which a treaty achieved its objective and
thereby affected states behavior.13 Whether a regime is successful (as a whole) in terms of solving the
problem it was created to address is at the heart of concept of effectiveness.14 For instance; a climate
regime is created to mitigate the effects of climate change and restore the climate equilibrium. If the
regime cannot bring about this desired result, it is ineffective despite the fact that states may have
lived up to their emission reductions commitments prescribed by the regime. This would be the case if

11 Garner, B., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition (2009) at 608.
12Mitchell, R.B., International Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994), at 30.
13 For insights in to concept of effectiveness see: Young, O.R., International Governance: Protecting the
Environment in Stateless Society, (Cornell University, 1994) at 142-152.
14 Ibid.
6

the emission commitments embodied by the regime are easily achievable by states in the normal
course of operations. Conversely, it is possible for a regime to be effective despite notoriously poor
compliance record. In the earlier example, a climate regime with an ambitious target may be effective
in restoring the climatic balance even when all the states have achieved only a minor portion of their
emissions commitments. Therefore, effectiveness being the ultimate goal of any regime first of all
requires creating obligations with capacity to compel states to change their behavior. These
obligations should be incorporated in a legal structure to constitute a treaty. Only then can one validly
discuss the notion of compliance which relates to enforcing the existing rules leaving out of its realm
the question of whether or not such rules are apt to achieve the objectives of the regime. In the earlier
example, compliance would relate to achieving the emission reduction commitment. Whether the
fulfillment of these commitments will bring the restoration of climatic balance is not the scope of
compliance. Thus far, it would be valid to conclude that high level of compliance, in as much as it
may reflect an effective regime; it could also be an indication of poor legislation characterized by
weak and shallow provisions falling short of inducing the desired behavioral change. Shallow and
generic treaty provisions are easier to comply with while stringent and complex provisions tend to
hamper compliance. Consequently compliance to treaty obligations partly depends on the textual
architecture of the treaty.
Implementation and Compliance
Implementation of an international regime mainly relates to the process of putting the commitments in
to practice.15 Essentially implementation has to do with all aspects of bringing commitments in to
reality. Particularly it deals with designing and promulgating legislations (including enforcement
clauses), constituting domestic and international institutions, determining their mandate and
administering regime bodies. In the course of these processes, it is apparent to see that ensuring
compliance is also considered as one objective of implementation. Nevertheless compliance can occur
regardless of implementation in the sense that it is conceivable to be in compliance due to factors not
related to implementation of an agreement. For instance; under the global climate regime, a party can
be in compliance with emission reduction commitments due to a major economic collapse which
brought its fossil fuel industries to their knees. Coincidental match state practice and requirements of
a regime amounts to compliance but the state cannot be said to have implemented the regime. Thus

15 Raustiala, K. and Slaughter, A. “International Law, International Relations and Compliance” in Carlnaes, W.,
Risse, T., and Simmons, B. (eds), The Handbook of International Relations (Sage Publications Ltd, 2002),
pp539-553, at 539.
7

implementation is conceptually neither necessary nor sufficient for compliance, although in practice it
is often critical.16
Dispute Settlement and Compliance
To a casual observer the notion of compliance may seem identical to dispute settlement. In general
dispute settlement in international law confers states the right to protect their individual interest and
thus builds upon adversarial structure where one state blames the other for interfering in the
enjoyment of its rights. In contrast compliance procedures are particularly aimed at fostering the
objectives of a treaty which represent common interest of parties. Hence a belief that the common
interest of a treaty is endangered suffices to raise questions against a party with regard to its
obligations. Compliance procedures draws upon a non-adversarial approach as the party who
triggered the procedures usually remains in the background when the oversight body administers the
question raised. However this does not mean the two concepts are exclusive of each other in MEAs.17
While all MEAs which have provided for compliance procedures also contain a dispute settlement
clauses, they have also ascertained the independence of each other usually by providing a “without
prejudice” clause in their compliance mechanisms.18 Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
dispute settlement provisions of MEAs are not usually invoked and when invoked they are
inefficient.19
4.2. Compliance with International Law: A Brief on Theories
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all
of their obligations almost all of the time.”20
Despite the lack of centralized enforcement mechanism, it appears perplexing to see that most
international agreements are obeyed. Studies on the subject of compliance with international law have
seen longstanding debate between theorists from international relations and international law
discourses. A subject in the forefront of controversy relates to explaining why states, despite being the
apex of public authority, would want to obey international law. A review of international relations
literature suggests a spectrum of reasons in this respect.

16 Ibid.
17 Treves, T., “The Settlement of Disputes and Non-Compliance Procedures”, in Treves, T., Pineschi, L., Tanzi,
A., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. and Jacur, F.R. (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and Effectiveness
of International Environmental Agreements (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2009), pp 499-518, at 517.
18 Ibid at 505.
19 Ibid at 517.
20 Henkin, L., How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, 1979) at 47.
8

A realist point of view believes that states obey international law only in so far as it coincides with
their national interest.21 Starting with a premise that the international system is anarchic with no
governing body, realism asserts that pursuit of national interest is the only incentive that convinces
states to accept (and comply with) an international commitment.22 As opposed to benevolent
institutions; states are self-centered entities which invariably maneuver to hijack the international
system to meet their national demands. The realists argue that international law will continue to be
obeyed not because states fear consequences of violating the terms but because of a continued pursuit
of national benefits in treaties.23 Therefore international law, according to realists, is a mere
epiphenomenal coincidence of interests of states.24
The rational functionalism approach argues that states come in to international agreements to solve
common problems they cannot solve unilaterally.25 Like the realists, they believe in the incentive of
national interest to obey international laws. However functionalists do not stress the cynical character
of states in international relations but contend that the international legal system is a collective good
from which all states can reap benefit.26 For them international agreements are obeyed because they
are built to be solutions for a common problem.27 They add that reputational concerns of states to
prove their reliability and appear capable of living up to international mores are the main reasons why
states want to obey international law.28
Others take international coercion as a compelling reason for states to discharge their international
obligations. International coercion can take two forms; one in the form of punishments (sticks) for
being in default of an international duty and another in the form of promises of reward for fulfillment
of an international obligation (carrots). For others coercion from internal sources plays a significant
role in inducing compliance to international agreements.

21 Simmons, B.A., “Compliance with International Agreements” (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science,
75 at 79.
22 Reus-Smit, C.(eds), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 15-
18.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Supra note 21, Simmons, at 80.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 For an overview of reputation and compliance with international law, see: Guzman, A.T., How International
Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 72-115.
9

Treaties create obligations that are expected to be obeyed by its parties. When all other components
are robust, higher rate of compliance enhances the effectiveness of a regime which is why choosing
the right approach to attain maximum compliance is taken seriously in the development of treaties.
The scholarship of developing a strategy capable of inducing and maintaining higher compliance
witnessed an ideological debate between the managerial approach and the sanction based (the
enforcement) approach. Advanced by Abrham Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes in their book “the new
Sovereignty”, the earlier presupposes that states violate international law inadvertently due to factors
such as ambiguity of the provisions or lack of capacity for performance29 and therefore cooperation to
solve such causes is the right path towards enhancing compliance.30 In contrast; the sanction based
thought asserts the necessity and importance of punishments for treaties that demand considerable
departure of state behavior from what they would have done without the treaty.31 Arguing that
measures creating costs for disobedience are better tools for effective compliance, they add the
managerial approach fails to recognize contextual factors which may necessitate the use of sanctions
or loss of benefits. Arguably both approaches have strong points and shortcomings. As we will see in
the latter sections, applying one of them does not necessary require the exclusion of the other.
5. Compliance in International Environmental Law
5.1. Making MEAs Successful: Cooperation for Compliance or Invocation of State

Responsibility?
States conclude an international treaty with the hope of achieving some benefit. Ratification of a
treaty is the most obvious mechanism of states declaring their consent to be bound by the terms of the
agreement.32 Deviating from the terms of an international agreement constitutes breach of an
international obligation and entails consequences under the laws of state responsibility.33 States
alleging to have sustained injury due to an internationally wrongful act of another state can invoke
state responsibility by virtue of which the offending state shall ensure cessation of the wrongful

29 Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H., The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1995) at 9-17
30 ibid at 3.
31Downs, G.W., Rocke, D.M., and Barsoom, P.N. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?” (1996) 50 International Organization, 379, at 383.
32 Hovi, J. and Halvorseen, A. “The nature, origin and impact of legally binding consequences: the case of the
climate regime” (2006) 6 International Environmental Agreements, 157 at 163.
33 International Law commission (ILC) Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, 2001, Article 1.
10

conduct, provide assurances of non-repetition and make reparation for injury.34 Failure of the
offending state to accord to these requirements entitles the injured party to take reprisal measure of
ceasing performance of an international obligation owed to that state.35 Moreover, the law of treaties
under the Vienna convention kicks in to allow termination or suspension of the treaty when the breach
in question amounts to a ‘material breach’.36 Essentially involving unilateral measures, this notion of
state responsibility is the conventional enforcement mechanism under general international law.
In respect of MEAs, the notion of state responsibility has been rarely used.37 Firstly invocation of state
responsibility involves confrontation and adversarial practice making it far less interesting and
sometimes futile for environmental treaties. The object of MEAs – protection of the environment –
does not square with confrontational enforcement mechanism. Confrontation degrades the spirit of
cooperation and is practically a prelude to termination of diplomacy. In light of the precautionary
approach which asserts for prompt preventive measures to avoid environmental degradation,
cooperation rather than confrontation affords better protection to the environment. The precautionary
approach heavily relies on collaboration of states in identifying and remedying an environmental
problem. Secondly; in light of the fact that responsibility heavily relies on identifying a state in default
of its international obligations, the inability of establishing a convincing causal link between a state’s
action (or omission) and damage for most environmental problems undercuts the effectiveness and
desirability of unilateral enforcement. Finally cessation of performance of an international obligation
owed to an offending state can be effective only against willful (intentional) breach of international
duty. In contrary to this, non-compliance in MEAs can result from various non-intentional factors
such as limitation of performance capacity. Supporting this assertion, the laws of state responsibility
have envisioned a possibility of derogation where a special treaty rule is put in place to that effect.38
By interpretation this exception can be extended to the non-compliance mechanisms adopted by
MEAs.39
The foregoing argument stands to serve that cooperation is the central tenet of compliance in MEAs.
In general environmental treaties uphold non confrontational compliance systems embracing

34 Ibid, article 42 and article 48.
35 Ibid, article 49.
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 60 (3).
37 Hovi and Halvorseen, Supra note 32.
38 ILC draft articles, article 55, supra note 33.
39 See generally: Pineschi, L., “Non-Compliance Procedures and the Law of State Responsibility” in Treves et
al., supra note 17, pp 483-497.
11

international cooperation.40 Justification of the cooperative features of MEA compliance mechanisms
is reflected in their meticulously formulated information gathering and reporting exercises which
increase states’ awareness of the objective of the treaty thereby boosting the propensity for a voluntary
compliance and coordinated action.41 In these regards it would not appear farfetched to notice that
MEAs square with the managerial view of rectifying non-compliance in non-adversarial manner.
Putting so much importance on identification of the root cause of non-compliance as first adopted by
the non-compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol on Substance that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(hereinafter called Montreal Protocol),42 Compliance procedures in MEAs take recognition of the
respective situations of non-complying states. The compliance mechanisms of Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (hereinafter called
Basel Convention)43 and that of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety44 have rehearsed the emphasis on
identification of the causes of non-compliance on individual basis. Consistent to the hypothesis of
managerial approach, promoting compliance in MEA draws upon states’ bona fide intent of
complying but for capacity reasons. This is one of the reasons why it is not uncommon to find MEAs
in which a non-complying party can rely on the assistance of others to build up its capacity for
enhanced compliance.
5.2. Place of Sanctions in MEA Compliance
Appreciation of cooperative approach in compliance procedures of most MEAs does not necessary
exclude application of “sticks” in the form of sanctions. Indeed most MEAs abstain from using the
term “sanctions” when discussing non-compliance as negotiators remain wary of the power of sticks.
Although numbered, there are MEAs whose compliance systems employ sanction. The 1973 CITES

40 Treves, T., “Non-Compliance Mechanisms in Environmental Agreements: The Research Method Adopted” in
Treves et al., supra note 17, pp 1-10, at 2.
41 Brunnee, J. “Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International Environmental Law” in
Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P.T., and Wolfrum R. (eds) Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), pp.1-23 ,at
14-15.
42 Decision X/10, “Review of Non-Compliance Procedure” (UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9, 3 December 1998), Annex II,
para. 7(D), at 26.
43 Decision VI/12 “Establishment of Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance” Basel
Convention Compliance Procedures, (Decisions adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the Parties to the Basel
Convention, UNEP/CHW.6/40 10 February 2003).
44 BS-I/7, “Establishment of Procedures and Mechanisms on Compliance under the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety” Cartagena Protocol Compliance Procedures, (Report of the First Meeting of the Parties serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15, 14 April 2004),
Annex, Section III, 1 (a), at 99..
12

has been exceptionally successful in enforcing compliance with a sanction based approach in the form
of trade suspensions.45 Another prominent example is the compliance mechanism of Montreal
Protocol which, under its article 8, refers to “treatment of parties found in non-compliance” and
further, with its non-compliance procedure, introduces an “indicative list” of measures to cases of
non-compliance.46 Observations of the practical experiences with compliance issues of the Montreal
Protocol suggest growing cases of resorts to measures with more of a sanction and less of cooperation
character.47 Shading light to the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol, we can identify sanction
oriented measures albeit presented in the form of requirement to participation in protocol’s carbon
mechanisms. These examples illustrate that sanctions are not totally evil to MEA compliance systems.
When combined with elaborate measures of facilitation and cooperation, sticks can, in fact, be
conducive to deter non-compliance.
A sound conclusion from the preceding paragraphs will be that adoption of a cooperative (managerial)
approach or enforcement approach in MEA compliance systems does not follow any common
standard. Prima facie all environmental treaties advocate for cooperation and assistance among parties
for enhanced compliance and implementation. However, history and experience dictate that mere
assertion of cooperation is inadequate to ensure effective compliance. Thus punitive measures are
increasingly finding crucial importance in many MEA compliance systems. Factors, including but not
limited to specific problem for which the MEA is established, its level of seriousness and the financial
capacity of parties play the decisive role in determining the blending of sanctions amidst cooperation
in compliance systems of MEAs. Ergo the two approaches do not necessarily exclude each other in
their appearance; instead they can be used together to develop effective compliance mechanism.
5.3. From developing new MEAs to enforcing the existing ones
The propagation of MEAs in the past decades failed, in many cases, to ensure that the environment is
protected in a sufficient manner. Such proliferation carries with it a room for equivalent increase in

45 For a review of success of sanctions in compliance history of CITES see: Sand, P.H. “Sanctions in case of
Non-Compliance and State Responsibility: Pacta sunt servanda – Or Else?” in Beyerlin et al., supra note 41,
pp.259-271.
46 Decision IV/5 “Non-compliance Procedure” Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance Procedures, para 3; Annex
V (Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, 25 November
1992).
47 For overview of practice of the non-compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol, see generally: Victor,
D.G. “The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance” in Victor D.G., Raustiala,
K. and Skolnikoff, B.E. (eds), Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments:
Theory and Practice (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1998), pp 137-177.
13

cases of non-compliance thus undermining the very essence of developing the MEAs. With the help
of non-state observers exposing cases of non-compliance and the academia delivering articulated
analysis of compliance theories, the international community is conferring equal importance to
enforcement of the existing MEAs. As a reflection of the growing importance attached to compliance,
regional organizations began to take up the duty of development of compliance guidelines. Most
notably, the UNECE enacted the “Guidelines for Strengthening Compliance with and Implementation
of multilateral environmental agreements in the ECE Region”48. While such organizations are aimed
at promoting compliance of MEAs with high relevance to the regional interest, MEA secretariats,
often drawing their mandate from their COPs, are also increasingly engaging in promoting
compliance of their respective MEA. Aside from the scattered efforts by MEA secretariats and
regional organizations to enhance compliance, there was a need for a concerted global approach
which would uphold states’ common interest in the environment. Among other objectives, this broader
approach would emphasize assisting developing countries and economies in transition enhance their
capacity to improve compliance records and appreciate participating in MEAs.
5.4. UNEP and MEA Compliance
Suffice to note that UNEP, for most of its life time since its establishment in 1972, has been burdened
with development of MEAs, one may argue that there was a blatant disregard to development in
compliance and enforcement aspects of the existing MEAs. Increasing awareness on compliance
loopholes underscored that enforcing the existing MEAs as opposed to formulating new ones is the
pressing issue if the environment was to be protected sufficiently. Hence compliance and enforcement
of MEAs were brought to the UNEP work structure.
Perhaps the milestone, in this regard, has been the development and adoption of “Draft Guidelines for
Compliance with and Enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements” by the Governing
Council of the UNEP in 2002.49 Supplemented by a detailed manual50 and thus recommended for use
by MEA secretariats and regional organizations, the guidelines seek to identify common grounds for
non-compliance and offer recommendations on how to alleviate them. Unlike the specific approach
followed by compliance efforts of regional organizations or MEA secretariats, UNEP guidelines

48 ECE/CEP/107. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2003/ece/cep/ece.cep.107.e.pdf, last
accesses, 20 May 2013.
49 UNEP/GCSS.VII/4/Add.2, http://www.unep.org/GC/GCSS-VII/default.asp, last accessed, 20May, 2013.
50 http://www.unep.org/delc/portals/119/UNEP_Manual.pdf, last accessed, 20May, 2013.
14

exhort a holistic approach toward enhancing compliance in a broader sense making them adaptable
and relevant to virtually all MEAs regardless of difference in objective and regional interest.
Although non-binding, these guidelines play a vital role in directing governments, MEA secretariats,
NGOs and regional institutions towards a coordinated approach for better compliance. As such they
put importance on co-ordination among states and international organizations for creation of strong
institutional capacity. With such a jump start, the UNEP continued to engage in a series of activities,
inter alia, disseminating the guidelines to stakeholders, strengthening the capacity of developing
countries, convening a series of regional workshops to gather comments and reviewing and testing the
guidelines in several MEAs.51 Being the melting pot of compliance systems of all MEAs, the UNEP
guidelines aspire to serve as foundation for future MEAs as well.
6. The Kyoto-Marrakesh Compliance System
6.1. Overview
The current climate regime has grown in its sophistication to include a range of legal arrangements
targeting emission reductions. In this section we concert our discussion on the procedures and
mechanisms put in place to ensure compliance with the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol. The
importance of compliance with the commitments of the Kyoto Protocol cannot be overemphasized as
even in the best scenario of 100 per cent achievement of the emission targets, climate change will
probably continue to take its toll. Unique features of the climate regime present unique challenges to
compliance theories and rules. Most importantly; Kyoto Protocol cuts deep across the economic
policy of states for emission reduction commitments involve altering the conduct and behavior of
private enterprises that hold vital place in sustaining economic security of states. Compliance with the
Kyoto commitments was certain to catalyze changes in the economic policy of states and thus the
process of developing compliance mechanisms was exhausting and at times frustrating too.
The Kyoto-Marrakesh compliance system is built on three pillars of operation. First there is the
enabling clause under article 18 of the protocol which states
“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first
session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address
cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an
indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-

51 For a review of the activities see: Mrema, E.M., “Cross-Cutting Issues to Ensuring Compliance with MEAs”
in Treves et al., supra note 17, pp.201-229 at 221-226.
15

compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall
be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.”

As per this provision, the first COP/CMP adopted the compliance procedures and established the
compliance committee marking a second pillar of the compliance mechanism. The committee is
composed of a plenary, a bureau, the facilitative branch and the enforcement branch. Thirdly, the
compliance committee developed detailed rules of procedure to govern the procedural routines of its
operation. Unlike other MEAs, the role of COP/CMP is marginal in the functioning of the Kyoto-
Marrakesh compliance procedures. Instead the compliance system significantly relies on findings and
opinions of team of experts coordinated by the secretariat pursuant to article 8 (2) of the protocol.
Although falling within the structure of the MRV rules and thus not part of the compliance committee
per se, these expert review teams (ERTs) hold an indispensable role in the compliance system.
Starting with the negotiation process, the following sections discuss these components and working
structure in a considerable detail.
6.2. Negotiating the Compliance Procedures: From Buenos Aires to Marrakesh to

COP/CMP.1
Negotiating a competent compliance system for the Kyoto obligations was one of the difficult tasks
faced by negotiators. The adoption of the Buenos Aires Program of Action in COP-4 heralded the
commencement of official work on the development of compliance mechanisms.52 Setting the motion
in such a way a Joint Working Group (JWG) was thereby established with a prior objective of
developing procedures by which compliance with the commitments of the protocol were to be
ensured.53 Starting with the identification of compliance related issues of the protocol; the JWG
proceeded with the development of substantive and procedural elements of the compliance system.
Parties soon began to hand in successive submissions54 wherein they reasoned the objective of the
planned compliance system and defined their propositions on several practical details. Just as the
other aspects of the climate regime, development of the compliance system enjoyed sheer scale of
divergence of interests and stances. Among other areas, intense negotiations ensued regarding
mandate of the enforcement branch (whether to empower it with compliance issues of limitation of

52 Decision 1/CP.4., “The Buenos Aires Plan of Action” (FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1, 25 January 1999), at 4.
53 Decision 8/CP.4 “Preparations for the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: matters related to decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 6”, Annex I and II
(FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1, 25 January 1999).
54
FCCC/SB/1999/MISC.4,
29
April
1999;
FCCC/SB/1999/MISC.12,
22
September
1999;
and
FCCC/SB/2000/MISC.2. 11 May 2000.
16

emissions only or to include reduction commitments too), capacity to trigger the compliance system,
the legal character of consequences of non-compliance and mode of adoption of the compliance
mechanisms. The struggle of reconciling these differences partly contributed to the creation of
innovative strategies which altogether made the final output an advanced legal arrangement in
contrast to previous MEA compliance procedures. Surviving all the seemingly irreconcilable
negotiation differences was also an indication that the regime was even more resilient than what was
originally thought.55
In the year 2000 COP-6, held at The Hague, saw a near collapse of the climate regime with the
suspension of talks due to opposing positions on issues of contribution of carbon sinks and use of
flexibility mechanisms. In the wake of The Hague trauma, the second part of COP-6 adopted the
Bonn agreement which picked up the pieces to seal a political deal on climate compliance
regime.56Most of the features and rules of the incumbent compliance system were agreed upon during
the Bonn agreement but were not structured in a legal text format. The commencement of COP-7 in
2001 in Marrakesh ascertained that agreement over most of the controversial issues was achieved but
for the mode of adoption and the legal implications of the consequences. The COP-7 decided to adopt
the legal text containing the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance of the Kyoto Protocol
and recommended the first COP/CMP to adopt these procedures.57 Failing to agree, COP-7 upheld the
decision to defer the mode of adoption talks to the first COP/CMP. Based on this recommendation the
first COP/CMP adopted the compliance procedures in 2005 as finalized and formulated in a legal
language in Marrakesh.58 The introduction of the compliance procedures marked a milestone in the
governance of the entire climate regime and heralded a new entrant to the list of compliance
mechanisms of MEAs.
6.3. Adoption of the Compliance System: Available options and Challenges
As the first COP/CMP was approaching, it became obvious that mode of adoption was going to be a
major agenda for the meeting. Drawing the attention of negotiators, the available options for adoption

55 Brunnee, J., “COPing with Consent: Law Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements.” (2002) 15
Leiden Journal of International Law, 1 at 4.
56 Decision 5/CP.6, “The Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action” Annex,
section VIII (FCCC/CP/2001/5, 25 September 2001) at 48.
57 Decision 24/CP.7, “Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol”,
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3. (21 January 2002) para 1 and 2,at 64.
58Kyoto Protocol Compliance Procedures (KP-CP): Decision 27/CMP.1, ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating
to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’, Annex, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 March 2006, at 92
17

were receiving meticulous examination. This was mainly because the choice of mode of adoption
entailed certain ramifications with a potential to spill over to other components of the compliance
system which may ultimately alter the key elements of Kyoto commitments. A point in case;
eligibility to participate in the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms is tied to methodological and reporting
requirements under Article 5 (1) and (2), and Article 7 (1) and (4) of the Protocol. As illustrated in the
following paragraphs, this interplay of the compliance system and the flexibility mechanisms of the
protocol results in different outcomes depending on the mode of adoption of the compliance
procedures.
As the preamble of Kyoto-Marrakesh Compliance Procedures declared, the COP/CMP has the
prerogative of determining the legal form of the compliance procedures.59 Apparently this prerogative
has never been put in to action thus leaving the concern over the legally binding nature of the
compliance procedures unresolved and open for debate. Adopting the compliance procedures by a
COP/CMP decision was the first option. One should, however, check whether decisions of COP/CMP
are binding legal instruments on parties. Noting that the protocol does not make an explicit provision
for binding nature of COP/CMP decisions, it would appear that decisions are not legally binding
instruments per se. Notwithstanding that, decisions are political agreements with a character of
imposing de facto control on the positions and behaviors of states and hence viewed as binding
enactments.60 Therefore the eventual effect of adopting the compliance procedures by a COP/CMP
decision would mean that all parties would be subject to the compliance rules and procedures.61 This
option then seems to favor fairness as it treats all states equally under one decision.
The interaction between compliance procedures and flexibility mechanisms would, therefore, be less
complicated as all states accept the compliance procedures through the mechanism of the decision
adopting it. Leaving no state outside the realm of the compliance procedure, this approach ensures
fairness to all parties as regards eligibility of flexibility mechanisms.
Amendment of the protocol was the second option for adoption of the compliance procedures. The
rules of amending the protocol emphasize agreement by consensus; in unison recognize the possibility

59 KP-CP preamble, Ibid,
60 See generally: Lefeber, R. “From the Hague to Boon to Marrakesh and Beyond: A Negotiating History of the
Compliance Regime under the Kyoto Protocol” in Hague Book of International Law (Kluwer Law International,
the Hague, 2001) at 25-54.
61 Ibid.
18

of differences by allowing for adoption by the three-fourth majority vote.62 Assuming that a proposal
for an amendment garners the required 75 % vote, the rule of enforcement dictates that the amended
part of the protocol will be effective only on the parties that have accepted the amendment.63 It
follows that an amendment for adoption of the compliance procedures will only be effective against
the parties who have explicitly accepted the amendment proposal. The possibility to decline from
accepting the amendment proposed for adoption of the compliance procedures means that the
flexibility mechanisms are available for the only Kyoto parties which have accepted the amendment.
Hence giving unequal opportunity for fulfilling emissions commitments, the amendment oriented
approach upsets the entire playground of climate obligations. The time consuming nature of an
amendment process presents yet another challenge. Entry in to force of an amendment relies on
securing acceptance by at least three-fourth of the Kyoto parties.64 In practice, this implies parliaments
and congresses of the parties will have to ratify the amendment and this will take substantial amount
of time thereby delaying the entry in to force of the compliance system. Therefore, an amendment
procedure for adoption of the compliance procedures is flawed with inherent challenges related to
lack of striking proper balance and timeliness.
In theory adoption by an amendment can be preferable over adoption by a decision as the earlier is
always legally binding with enforcement consequences. However the improbability of achieving a
consensus and protracted process of entry in to force render the amendment route less meritorious to
the effective enforcement of the compliance mechanisms. The last sentence of article 18 of the
protocol which reads “Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.” seems to suggest a
middle way in which the procedures entailing soft consequences do not need amendment while those
involving harder sanctions should undergo the amendment procedure. The discussion on the legal
character of the consequences in the latter section elaborates more on this.
6.4. The Compliance Committee

6.4.1. General Features
Central to the climate regime compliance procedure is the compliance committee shouldering the task
of facilitating, promoting and enforcing compliance with the commitments of the protocol.

62 Kyoto Protocol, Article 20 (3), supra note 5.
63 Kyoto Protocol, Article 20 (3), para 4 and para 5, supra note 5.
64 ibid
19

Establishing a committee composed of four functional arms namely; the plenary, the bureau, the
facilitative branch and the enforcement branch65, the Kyoto compliance procedure is the first of its
kind to combine facilitation and enforcement functions within the same committee.66 Due to the
administrative nature of their functions, this study does not seek to examine the plenary and the
bureau segments of the committee.
Despite the differences in their mandate and functions, the two branches are urged to cooperate in
their operations whenever situations so demand.67 Cooperation in the two branches merits betterment
of compliance records especially in cases where the regimes of facilitation and enforcement overlap.
For example, when states are heading to failure of submission of annual inventories, they can request
for advice and facilitation while at the same time having to deal with risk of triggering the
enforcement arm for non-compliance. Individual cases of non-compliance are handled by one of the
two branches as per the allocation made by the bureau in accordance with their respective mandates.68
While the facilitative branch can deal with questions of implementation relating to all parties, the
enforcement branch handles questions of implementation pertaining to the commitments of Annex I
countries. The branches do not make individual reports to the COP/CMP as all activities of the
committee including list of decisions taken are reported to through the plenary.69
One striking difference of the Kyoto compliance committee from those of other MEAs can be found
in the decision making mandate of the committee. In many cases the mandate of MEA compliance
committees goes only as far as identifying and investigating cases of alleged non-compliance and
reporting the findings to the supervising body (usually the COP/MOP). In numbered instances as in
the case of the Montreal Protocol, such functions can include making appropriate recommendations. 70
A little advanced mandate can be found in the Aarhus convention (on access to information, public
participation and access to justice in environmental matters) compliance procedure which vests upon
the committee the authority to adopt measures of facilitative nature as long as cooperation and
agreement from the non-complying party can be secured.71 In general it is submitted that the ultimate

65 KP-CP, section II (2), supra note 58, at 93.
66 Brunnee, J., “The Kyoto Protocol: A Testing Ground for Compliance Theories?” Heidelberg Journal of
International Law (2003) 255 at 256.
67 KP-CP, section II (7), supra note 58, at 93.
68 KP-CP, section VII (1), supra note 58, at 97.
69 KP-CP, section III (2), a, supra note 58, at 94
70 Montreal Protocol Compliance Non-Procedure, para 9, supra note 46, at 45.
71 Decision I/7; “Review of Compliance”, (ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, “Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
20

power of deciding whether a party is in non-compliance or not is bestowed upon meeting of parties of
respective MEAs. With unequivocal empowerment of the enforcement branch to issue declarations of
non-compliance, the Kyoto compliance procedure introduced a new chapter as regards the power of
compliance committee.72 As the enforcement branch de jure holds a decision making power, the role
of the COP/CMP is, accordingly confined to reviewing appeals against the decisions of the
enforcement branch and that too is only possible for cases of denial of due process.73 It is interesting
to notice that in case the COP/CMP agrees with at least three quarters majority to override the adopted
decision, it can only refer the case back to the enforcement branch for re-evaluation meaning that it
cannot proceed to conclude that the decision was wrong and the subject party is in compliance.
On membership matters, history of development of MEA compliance systems confirms that the
members of the committee are usually representatives of the member states. This shall not, however,
be construed to imply the non-existence of compliance committees whose members are selected in
their personal capacity. Following the footsteps of compliance procedures of the Aarhus Convention,
the Barcelona Convention (on Protection of the Mediterranean Sea) and the Cartagena Protocol (on
Biosafety to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity), members of the compliance committee of
the Kyoto Protocol are selected in their individual capacity with a recognized competence relating to
climate change.74
In all other compliance committees including those composed of members in individual capacity, the
important question of declaring the non-compliance of a party was invariably the mandate of the
governing body (usually COP/CMP) of the regime. Hence the loophole in such compliance systems
appears conspicuous in the fact that decisions in the oversight body take cognizance of multitude of
factors than just findings and recommendations of the committee. In as much as governing bodies of
MEAs try to harmonize their decision with the recommendations of their compliance committees, the
fact that recommendations can be set aside remains a challenge for non-compliance governance in
MEAs. While the assertion of composing compliance committees with individuals of technical
expertise rather than state affiliation existed before the birth of the Kyoto-Marrakesh compliance
system, the novelty in latter comes in its extensive effort of minimizing political intervention
(depoliticizing compliance). The Kyoto Protocol compliance procedure indeed pioneers the concept

Environmental Matters; Aarhus Convention Compliance Procedures, 2004), Section XI Consideration by the
Compliance Committee..
72 KP-CP, section XV, supra note 58, at 102.
73 KP-CP, section XI (1), supra note 58, at 100.
74 KP-CP, section II (6), supra note 58, at 93.