University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Graduate Masters Theses
Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Theses
12-31-2014
Cognitive Processes and Moderators of
Willingness in Individuals with Social Anxiety
Disorder and Non-Anxious Controls in Response
to a Social Performance Task
Lauren P. Wadsworth
University of Massachusetts Boston
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Theses at ScholarWorks at UMass
Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wadsworth, Lauren P., “Cognitive Processes and Moderators of Willingness in Individuals with Social Anxiety Disorder and Non-
Anxious Controls in Response to a Social Performance Task” (2014). Graduate Masters Theses. Paper 287.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND MODERATORS OF WILLINGNESS IN
INDIVIDUALS WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER AND NON-ANXIOUS
CONTROLS IN RESPONSE TO A SOCIAL PERFORMANCE TASK
A Thesis Presented
by
LAUREN P. WADSWORTH
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies,
University of Massachusetts Boston,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
December 2014
Clinical Psychology Program
ii
© 2014 by Lauren P. Wadsworth
All rights reserved
iii
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND MODERATORS OF WILLINGNESS IN
INDIVIDUALS WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER AND NON-ANXIOUS
CONTROLS IN RESPONSE TO A SOCIAL PERFORMANCE TASK
A Thesis Presented
by
LAUREN P.WADSWORTH
Approved as to style and content by:
_______________________________________
Sarah Hayes-Skelton, Assistant Professor
Chairperson of Committee
_______________________________________
Lizabeth Roemer, Professor
Member
_______________________________________
Laurel Wainwright, Senior Lecturer
Member
_____________________________________
Alice S. Carter, Program Director
Clinical Psychology Program
_____________________________________
Jane Adams, Chairperson
Psychology Department
iv
ABSTRACT
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND MODERATORS OF WILLINGNESS IN
INDIVIDUALS WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER AND NON-ANXIOUS
CONTROLS IN RESPONSE TO A SOCIAL PERFORMANCE TASK
December 2014
Lauren P. Wadsworth, B.A., Smith College
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston
Directed by Assistant Professor Sarah Hayes-Skelton
The present study investigated differences between individuals with social anxiety
disorder (SAD) and non-anxious controls (NAC) on measures of thought processes and
anxiety responses surrounding an anxiety-provoking situation. Participants gave a
spontaneous speech to an audience and reported their anxiety throughout. Measures of
trait decentering and anxiety, situational anxiety, negative thoughts and believability, and
willingness to repeat the task were administered. Compared to NAC, individuals with
SAD reported a higher prevalence of negative thoughts, found the thoughts more
believable, reported lower levels of trait decentering, and reported less willingness to
repeat an anxiety-provoking task. Collapsing the groups, we found an inverse relationship
between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness to repeat the task, and a
positive correlation between decentering and willingness. We did not find evidence to
support that decentering and believability moderate this relationship. The present study
partially supports the proposed model of SAD, as the SAD and NAC groups differed at
each step of the proposed model, however moderation analyses were not significant.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my mentor Sarah Hayes-Skelton for her unwavering patience,
support, and assistance in the conceptualization, process, and development of this thesis.
She has been at my side through every step of the process, helping me stretch and grow
my abilities constantly. Thank you to Lizabeth Roemer for the support both theoretical
and emotional throughout this process. Thank you to Laurel Wainwright for being a part
of this thesis despite how busy she is. Finally, a big thank you to my family and loving
wife for being so supportive and patient with me through this, and all other milestones
big and small in my life.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
………………………………………………………………..
v
LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………………………..
vii
LIST OF TABLES
…………………………………………………………………………….
viii
CHAPTER Page
1. SPECIFIC AIMS ……………………………………………………………………
1
2. BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
………………………………….
5
Model of Social Anxiety Disorder
………………………………………….
5
Negative Thoughts ……………………………………………………………….
8
Believability of Negative Thoughts ………………………………………..
10
Willingness to Engage in Future Situations
……………………………..
10
The Filter: Potential Adaptive Strategies
…………………………………
12
Current Study ………………………………………………………………………
14
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS ………………………………….
17
Participants
………………………………………………………………………….
17
Screening
…………………………………………………………………………….
18
Procedure ……………………………………………………………………………
21
Assessment Measures …………………………………………………………..
22
4. RESULTS ……………………………………………………………………………..
24
Preliminary Analyses ……………………………………………………………
24
Hypotheses 1a-2b: Between Group Comparisons on Decentering,
Negative Thoughts, Believability, and Willingness ………………….
26
Hypotheses 3a-3b: Moderation Analyses ………………………………..
27
5. DISCUSSION ………………………………………………………………………..
32
REFERENCE LIST …………………………………………………………………………..
41
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1. Hypothesized relationship between anxiety, decentering, believability,
and willingness in NAC and SAD groups ………………………………….
16
2. Order of study assessments and administration of questionnaires
………..
21
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Comparison of demographic characteristics between the socially
anxious and non-anxious control groups ……………………………………
25
2. T-test results comparing socially anxious and non-anxious control
groups on Frequency of Negative Thoughts, Believability of
Thoughts, Trait decentering, Willingness to complete task, and
Clinical Severity Ratings …………………………………………………………
27
3. Summary Statistics and correlations for hypothesis 3a ……………………….
28
4. Analysis investigating hypothesis 3a: Decentering as a moderator of
the relationship between negative thoughts and willingness …………
29
5. Analysis investigating hypothesis 3b: Believability as a moderator of
the relationship between negative thoughts and willingness …………
31
1
CHAPTER 1
SPECIFIC AIMS
Over the past few decades, researchers studying social anxiety disorder (SAD)
have become increasingly interested in the cognitive processes that maintain the disorder.
Models of SAD suggest that negative feedback loops surround each social and
performance situation. In these negative feedback loops, individuals expect that a given
social interaction will go poorly, experience anxiety and negative thoughts during the
event, interpret their performance as negative, find those negative interpretations very
believable, and predict that future events will also go unfavorably, leading them to more
avoidance of and less willingness to engage in future social or performance situations.
Throughout this loop, individuals experience anxiety before, during, and after social
encounters or performance situations. The interpretations of each event then serve to
perpetuate social anxiety. During each stage of the above model, individuals experience
negative and self-critical thoughts, which are referred to as “maladaptive thoughts”
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). There has been a fair amount of research suggesting that
maladaptive thoughts maintain SAD symptomology (e.g., Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin,
2003; Lundh & Sperling, 2002; Mellings & Alden, 2000). In addition, research suggests
that individuals with SAD find these thoughts more believable than individuals without
2
SAD (Kiko et al., 2012). Therefore, not only do individuals with SAD experience more
negative thoughts, they also consider these thoughts an accurate representation of their
performance. Together, these beliefs provide heightened “evidence” that future events
will also go negatively, which increases behavioral avoidance (a key aspect of SAD) by
decreasing the individual’s willingness to engage in future social situations.
On the other hand, little is known about adaptive cognitive strategies that might
be naturally employed to mitigate the cycle of anxiety. In one adaptive technique, termed
decentering, individuals step back and evaluate their thoughts and feelings more
objectively (Safran & Segal, 1990). Such metacognitive cognitive strategies could act as
a filter, weakening the negative feedback loop, and thus decreasing the anxiety
experienced by individuals surrounding social and performance situations. This more
objective interpretation of events might also be linked to reduced avoidance of social
situations (and greater willingness to engage). Evidence of individuals without SAD
engaging in more decentering than those with SAD might suggest that naturally engaging
in such cognitive processes also aids in prevention of SAD.
Using a sample of individuals with SAD and those without significant anxiety
(non-anxious controls; NAC), we evaluated differences in trait and state cognitive
processes (such as the frequency of negative thoughts, believability of those thoughts,
and decentering) experienced and employed in relation to a potentially anxiety-provoking
performance situation in the form of a speech task. In addition, we measured state levels
of subjective anxiety before and during the task, and willingness to repeat the task
immediately following its completion.
3
1. To investigate differences in a) maladaptive thoughts experienced during the
speech task and b) degree of willingness to repeat the task between the SAD
and NAC groups.
a) We hypothesized that, consistent with previous research, following the speech
task individuals with SAD would report higher levels of negative thoughts
experienced during the task than those in the NAC group.
b) We also hypothesized that individuals with SAD would report less willingness
to engage in a similar task in the future compared to the NAC group.
2. Investigate differences in a) decentering, an ameliorative cognitive process
and b) believability, an exacerbating cognitive process, between SAD and
NAC groups.
a) We hypothesized that the NAC group would exhibit higher levels of trait
decentering compared to individuals with SAD.
b) Conversely, we hypothesized that the NAC group would report lower levels of
believability of negative thoughts encountered, suggesting that they may be
using more advantageous cognitive approaches (i.e., decentering) to anxiety
provoking situations, giving them a broader perspective regarding negative
thoughts that arise.
3. Investigate if levels of decentering and/or believability moderate the
relationship between post-event negative thoughts and willingness to repeat
task between SAD and NAC groups.
4
a) Collapsing the groups together, we hypothesized that there would be an
inverse relationship between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness
to repeat the task and that decentering and believability would moderate this
relationship, in that when low levels of decentering and/or high believability
were reported there would be a strong association between negative thoughts
and willingness, whereas in high levels of decentering and/or low believability
the relationship would be weakened or absent.
5
CHAPTER 2
BACKROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Feeling nervous in evaluative or interactive social situations is a normative
experience (Kiko et al., 2012). However, this anxiety can start causing significant distress
once it reaches a certain threshold. This threshold has been classified as social anxiety
disorder (SAD). According to DSM-IV, SAD is characterized by marked and persistent
fear of negative evaluation during performance situations or social interactions often due
to fears of poor performance or of showing physical signs of anxiety (American
Psychological Association, 1994). SAD is a disabling condition that affects
approximately 12% of the population (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005)
and is associated with higher financial dependency, lower wages, lower educational
achievement (Heimberg & Becker, 2002), and interference with both romantic and
platonic relationships (Whisman, Sheldon, & Goering, 2000).
Model of Social Anxiety Disorder
Models of SAD suggest that social anxiety is characterized by maladaptive
cognitions including an increased focus on internal experiences during a social
interaction or performance, which is followed by negative predictions of future events
6
and then avoidance of specific social situations (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Herbert &
Cardaciotto, 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). These maladaptive cognitions also include
the individuals’ interpretation of their abilities and performance as largely negative, and a
comparison of this self-assessment to the suspected interpretation by the audience. These
maladaptive thoughts occur before, during, and after anxiety provoking events, and work
together as part of a negative feedback loop to exacerbate, maintain, and/or perpetuate the
distressing symptoms of SAD.
In their model, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) break down this negative feedback
loop into a series of parts that cycle throughout an anxiety-provoking social situation.
They propose that upon entering the situation, individuals with SAD predict that their
audience will negatively evaluate them. The audience can be anyone from an authority
figure with power over their job or education, to a stranger encountered on the street. The
key is that individuals perceive the other person/people as evaluative. Viewing the
situation in this context leads the individuals to perceive themselves as performers. When
this is paired with characteristic negative expectations of ability, individuals view
themselves as inadequate at such “performances.”
The prediction and experience of poor performance is imagined to have social
consequences or losses, such as not making new friends, failure in dating situations, and
not making gains in work or school. These potential losses then activate a fear response,
as the event is encoded as socially dangerous. Perceiving a threat in the environment then
triggers cognitive and physiological manifestations of anxiety, such as activation of the
autonomic nervous system and increased allocation of attentional resources to the
environment. Along with physiological symptoms, individuals focus on detecting cues in
7
the environment such as confirmation from the audience that they are performing
inadequately or displaying visible signs of anxiety. These cues can range from potential
signs of actual boredom (“audience” yawning) to positive cues (“audience” smiling;
Laposa, Cassin & Rector, 2010). In either case, the cues are interpreted negatively. For
example, the audience smiling might be encoded as laughing, thinking the performer is
stupid. This negative interpretation of the experience then leads to increased negative
prediction of future performance and likely avoidance of such circumstances,
perpetuating the cycle.
The aforementioned steps of the feedback loop lead to cognitive, behavioral, and
physical symptoms of anxiety. The cognitive symptoms include the maladaptive
thoughts, like those mentioned above, that confirm the predicted negative performance.
Behavioral symptoms include avoidance and safety behaviors, or behaviors that usually
include distancing oneself from the situation, due to being unwilling to engage in anxiety
provoking situations (Wells, Stopa, & Clark, 1995). Finally, physical symptoms include
manifestations of autonomic arousal, such as racing heart, sweating, and blushing. These
physical symptoms are not only uncomfortable to experience, but they also contribute to
fears that the audience will notice that the individual is experiencing anxiety. According
to this model, these cognitive, behavioral, and physical symptoms of anxiety confirm the
individual’s prediction of poor performance, which in turn, exacerbates the symptoms
and negative interpretation of the situation, completing the cycle, feeding back into the
loop.
8
Negative Thoughts
One of the key components of the Rapee and Heimberg (1997) model, and the
part that we will focus on, is the encoding of negative thoughts and negative self-
evaluation with a specific focus on potential mechanisms through which the self-
evaluations are encoded more and less negatively. Individuals with and without SAD
experience negative thoughts (Laposa et al., 2010). However, once these negative self-
evaluations reach a certain level, they become overwhelming, characterizing SAD. This
higher level of symptom severity is partially due to the fact that individuals with SAD
focus almost exclusively on the negative aspects and cues of a situation, and also find
them more believable (Kiko et al., 2012). Similarly, when compared to a low social
anxiety symptom group, individuals with high social anxiety symptoms report increased
believability of their negative thoughts pertaining to an upcoming anxiety-provoking
situation (Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006).
It is adaptive to interpret past events, learn from them, and in turn, better plan for
the future. However, the content of social situational interpretation in individuals with
SAD is four times more negative than those without SAD (Stopa & Clark, 1993),
indicating that there is a difference between individuals with and without SAD in their
interpretation of social events. Thus (like the other symptoms of SAD mentioned above),
at some level negative thoughts are normative, but high levels of this negativity have
been associated with clinical levels of SAD (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Perini, Abbott &
Rapee, 2006). These higher levels usually include increased negative self-evaluation and
the ignoring or misinterpretation of cues suggesting successful performance.
9
Theoretically, we could expand the Rapee and Heimberg (1997) model and
suggest that the extra allocation of attentional resources focusing on cues that confirm the
individuals’ poor performance self-evaluation hypothesis could exacerbate negative
thoughts and believability of them. Since individuals with SAD primarily focus on
negative cognitions (engaging in more negative self-evaluation) and ignore or alter
positive feedback (Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008; Laposa et al., 2010; Clark
& Arkowitz, 1975; Rapee & Lim, 1992), they are likely engaging in more negative
interpretations and increased believability of them, leading to more negative expectations
of future interactions, and in turn lower willingness to re-enter the situation.
Alternatively, individuals without SAD interpret both positive and negative
environmental cues, carrying with them a more broadened evaluation of their
performance, leading to more positive predictions of future events (Laposa et al., 2010).
Interestingly, these findings do not extend to nonsocial events, suggesting that individuals
with SAD have a unique set of maladaptive cognitive processes specific to social
situations (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Stopa & Clark, 1993). As described in
more detail below, this more broadened perspective, in turn, would likely lead to less
negative pre-event cognitions when approaching the next social situation (i.e., a more
positive feedback loop).
Thus, research suggests that individuals with SAD experience a higher proportion
of negative thoughts (and higher focus on them) than their non-socially anxious
counterparts, before, during, and in response to social situations. This increase in negative
thoughts, paired with a higher focus on them, and believability of them (Clark & Wells,
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) likely perpetuates SAD symptoms and decreases
10
willingness. Our research will assess the presence of these negative thoughts, and
examine what cognitive processes individuals with and without SAD are engaging in that
may be exacerbating or ameliorating, or filtering the negative cues.
Believability of Negative Thoughts
In addition to a higher prevalence of negative thoughts, individuals with SAD also
interpret their negative thoughts as more believable (Kiko et al., 2012; Tanner et al.,
2006). Believability can be related to more commonly studied construct of fusion, the
cognitive quality of taking one’s thoughts too seriously (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999) and causing a more narrowed perspective (Eifert et al., 2009; Kocovski, Fleming,
& Rector, 2009). The danger of fusion or believability, when considered in the context of
individuals with SAD who tend to interpret largely negative thoughts, is that it will lead
to a stronger negative association with social interaction and performance situations,
which will then lead to higher avoidance of such situations. In support of this theory,
greater fusion has been linked to higher avoidance (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001).
This increase in believability likely strengthens the interpretation of the negative
thoughts, increasing negative predictions of future performance. Similar to research on
fusion, we hypothesize that increased believability of negative thoughts will be related to
less willingness to repeat an anxiety provoking situation.
Willingness to Engage in Future Situations
In the present study, “willingness” refers to how disposed the individual is to
repeat the speech task. This measure attempts to model likeliness of future avoidance or
11
approaching of social interactions. Willingness can be compared theoretically to both
experiential (attempting to escape, avoid, alter, or conceal undesirable emotions and
thoughts; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996) and behavioral avoidance.
Research suggests that there is greater experiential avoidance in individuals with SAD
compared to non-anxious controls (Heuer, Rink, & Becker, 2007; Kashdan et al., 2013).
Addressing and reducing experiential avoidance is a focus of many behavioral therapies
including acceptance and commitment therapy (Hayes & Wilson, 1994) and dialectical
behavior therapy (Linehan, 1994). Though research has yet to explore the relationship
between experiential avoidance and SAD in depth, treatment research suggests that
addressing it might be a key mechanism of change (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007).
Similarly, greater behavioral avoidance has been associated with greater SAD
symptomology (Moitra, Herbert & Forman, 2008). Conceptually, as mentioned above,
we also see willingness as similar to behavioral avoidance. For example, someone with
high anxiety surrounding class presentations would likely want to avoid class
presentations and would therefore score low on willingness to repeat a presentation
directly after giving one. Without this willingness to engage in feared situations and the
therapy that follows, individuals remain in the cycle of anxiety, likely with stable or
worsening symptoms.
Adding willingness to the model, we hypothesize that experiencing a higher level
of negative thoughts and believability of those thoughts would be linked to lower
willingness to engage in similar situations in the future. This is similar, theoretically to
operant conditioning, where individuals are less likely to repeat negative experiences
(Skinner, 1937). With operant conditioning in mind, it makes sense that individuals with
12
SAD engage in behavioral avoidance of social situations that previously left them feeling
humiliation, failure, and rejection.
As mentioned above, fears and anxiety related to social experiences is a
normative experience. However, we hypothesize that individuals without SAD will have
higher willingness to repeat anxiety-provoking situations. Being willing to engage in
anxiety provoking situations allows individuals to actually engage in the situations and
experience outcomes, both positive and negative, and thus, have a broader set of
expectancies of future events. This is likely also corroborated by the aforementioned
fewer negative thoughts and reduced believability of them experienced by individuals
without SAD.
The Filter: Potential Adaptive Strategies
Recent studies have found evidence that maladaptive cognitive processes are core
mechanisms that perpetuate SAD (Kiko et al., 2012). However, less is known about
adaptive strategies that may protect individuals from the consequences of having
negative thoughts. Adaptive cognitive strategies might act as filters to interpret social and
performance situations more broadly, considering both negative and positive evidence.
This “filter” may then lead to individuals anticipating future situations to have both
positive and negative aspects, increasing willingness to engage in future situations, thus
protecting them from developing debilitating social anxiety. As described below, one of
these adaptive strategies may be decentering, or the process of seeing thoughts or feelings
as objective events in the mind rather than personally identifying with them (Safran &
Segal, 1990).
13
Decentering may reduce the perceived likelihood of negative social cost
experienced by individuals with SAD. Models of SAD suggest that individuals with SAD
view social events (and predicted failures) as more “costly” than their NAC counterparts
(Butler & Matthews, 1993; Foa & Kozak, 1985). In fact, experimental models suggest
that reducing cost-estimates of social events increases improvement of individuals with
SAD, even without adjusting for likelihood of future negative social events (Foa et al.,
1996; Uren, Szabo ́, & Lovibond, 2004). Thus, symptoms decrease when individuals
place less value on poor social performance, even if they still predicted that future events
would be negative. Attributing less cost to one’s performance likely takes off some
cognitive “weight”, decreasing the cognitive symptoms of anxiety. These findings
suggest that stepping back and evaluating potential costs from a more broadened (and
adaptive) perspective may lead to lower SAD symptomology by reducing the cost
associated with performance.
This concept of “stepping back” can be thought of in the context of the cognitive
process decentering. Decentering has been shown as a potential change agent of cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT) (Fresco et al., 2007) and may interrupt the negative feedback
loop that perpetuates and exacerbates anxiety (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012).
Recently, Hayes-Skelton and Graham (2012) investigated whether decentering
contributed to cognitive reappraisal, a link hypothesized by others (Ingram & Hollon,
1986). Results suggested that decentering accounts for a large portion of the relationship
between cognitive reappraisal and social anxiety, suggesting that it may be an adaptive
cognitive tool for coping with the negative thoughts following social and performance
events. As mentioned above, both individuals with and without SAD experience negative
14
thoughts during social interactions, but individuals with SAD focus mainly on the
negative. Since decentering has been observed to have a negative correlation with SAD
symptoms (Hayes-Skelton & Graham, 2012), we hypothesized that decentering may be a
tool that allows individuals without SAD to view a social situation from a more
broadened perspective, considering both positive and negative cues. This adaptive
cognitive strategy may lead to fewer negative thoughts overall, and, in turn, less negative
predictions for future events. Having a less negative prediction for future events then
leads the individual to view social interactions as less threatening, again allowing them to
view the next event with a more broadened, or decentered perspective. With this less
negative perspective in mind, individuals might be more willing to engage in similar
situations in the future.
In summary, the literature has found that both the situational (during event) and
expanded (pre, during and post event processing) negative feedback loops are associated
with SAD symptoms and severity. We are interested in learning more about negative
thoughts in multiple parts of the expanded loop and potential adaptive strategies that can
be used to interrupt the negative nature of the cycle in individuals with SAD, increasing
their willingness to engage in future social interactions.
Current Study
The present study investigated multiple parts of the aforementioned feedback loop
(see Figure 1), specifically whether there are differences between those with and without
clinically significant anxiety on measures of the number of negative thoughts
experienced, willingness to engage, believability of negative thoughts, and decentering
15
surrounding an anxiety-provoking speaking task. We investigated this experimentally
using a speech task, as it is typical for individuals with and without SAD to experience
negative self-evaluative thoughts during public speaking tasks (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark,
Williams, & Morrison, 2006). We hypothesized that, consistent with previous research,
following the speech task individuals with SAD would report higher levels of negative
thoughts experienced during the task, higher believability of those thoughts, and lower
trait levels of decentering than those in the NAC group.
Additionally, we investigated whether or not believability and decentering moderated
the negative feedback loop of negative thoughts and avoidance. Measures of this
relationship included trait decentering, anticipatory and during-task anxiety, post-event
negative thoughts and believability, and willingness to repeat a speech task. Each of these
measures gave us information about the individual’s experience of each part of the loop
(pre, during, and post event). The willingness measure was used as a tool to simulate
prediction of engagement in future events (high willingness suggesting a more positive
prediction of engaging in future speeches, and low suggesting a more negative
prediction). Collapsing the two groups together, we hypothesized that there would be an
inverse relationship between the amount of negative thoughts and willingness to repeat
the task and that decentering and believability would moderate this relationship, in that
when low levels of decentering and/or high believability were reported there would be a
stronger association between negative thoughts and willingness, whereas in high levels of
decentering and/or low believability the relationship would be weakened or absent.
16
Figure 1.
Hypothesized relationship between anxiety, decentering, believability, and willingness in
NAC and SAD groups
